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An Evaluation
of the Total Quality
Management
Implementation
Strategy for the
Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor Project at
NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center
ective
This document is an evaluation of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration's (NASA' s) Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) strategy to implement
Total Quality Management (TQM) in the Advanced
Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) Project. TQM is the
application of quantitative methods and human
resources operating in a supportive cultural environ-
ment to continuously improve and control product
quality and performance of the enterprise, The external
and intemal environments at MSFC will be analyzed
for their effects on the ASRM TQM strategy. Organi-
zational forms, cultures, management systems,
problem-solving techniques, and training will be assess-
ed for their influences on the implementation. Literature
searches and surveys will be the basis for determining
management and employee expectations and perceived
status of TQM, and to correlate widely accepted
philosophies to the observed strategic direction.
This analysis is intended to provide a better under-
standing of how MSFC's approach to TQM evolved to
its current form. The influence of ASRM's effort will
be assessed relative to its impact on mature projects as
well as future projects currently awaiting "new start"
approval. Recommendations will be offered for changes
and/or additions to the current strategy that would
make it more effective as a long range, continuous
improvement program. •
\
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ntroduction
In the late 1950's the United States and Russia were in
a race that would drive technology beyond realms
imaginable. The goal was to be the first country to put
an object in orbit about the Earth. On October 4, 1957,
the Russians achieved this goal with the launch of
Sputnik I, setting the stage for the great space race--
landing a man on the moon.
During this time frame the U.S. decided a dedicated
civilian government agency was needed to spearhead
such an effort. It was partially derived from an organi-
zation called NACA (National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics), recognized as the world's premier
aeronautical research organization since 1915. NACA
was instrumental in testing remarkable flying
machines in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, support-
ing the country's wartime needs. The NACA era ended
on October 1, 1958, with the creation of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
NASA's first endeavor was the X-15 aircraft._
Several NASA field and research centers were estab-
lished throughout the U.S. over the subsequent years.
MSFC was established on the Army'sRedstone Arsenal
near Huntsville, Alabama, on July 1, 1960. Its primary
charter was to provide the propulsion systems for
manned spacecraft. The MSFC charter was partially
influenced by the existence of facilities, personnel
skills, and contributing organizations in the geographi-
cal area. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA)
was in post-war operation at Redstone Arsenal, per-
forming much of the nation's development on large
rocketry. The scientists who led Germany's V-2 rock-
etry program during World War II had been located at
Redstone to work on America's spacecraft systems,
including propulsion, avionics, guidance, navigation,
and structures. As MSFC became chartered, the Ger-
man engineering leader, Wernher von Braun, became
MSFC's first director, and the MSFC work force and
facilities were transferred from the ABMA. Charter
members of the ABMA transition who were inter-
viewed discussed at length those exciting times,
concluding that the MSFC culture became a composite
of NACA, ABMA, Wemher von Braun, German sci-
entists, and other factors.
MSFC developed progressively larger propulsion
systems over the next few years that led to the space-
craft that carried man t_ the moon--the Saturn V
rocket. It was an all-liquid propellant, expendable
rocket with a crew capacity of three and a payload
capacity of 250,000 pounds to low-Earth orbit, with a
105,000-pound capacity on a lunar trajectory. MSFC
engineers and scientists designed and manufactured
the first prototypes and flight vehicles at MSFC. On
July 20, 1969, the ultimate goal was realized with Neil
Armstrong taking the first step on the Moon.
During this time frame the U.S. was enjoying the post-
World War II era with its manufactured goods deemed
"best in the world".2 Federal funding was readily
available, very few federal rules and regulations
existed for NASA, and the American people were
united in the effort to make the U.S. the leader in space
exploration. However, during the late sixties and early
seventies the U.S. was involved in a military conflict in
Vietnam which was consuming large amounts of fed-
eral dollars. The focus of American politics shifted
from an already won space race to the Vietnam con-
flict. While NASA wanted to continue space explora-
tion (Skylab, Moonbase, and Mars Missions) at an
accelerated pace, federal funding and support for the
space program was diminishing. Congress felt that a
space program was needed since its benefits had greatly
enhanced life on Earth, but funding was becoming
more difficult to allocate. For these reasons, Congress
directed NASA to develop a low-cost vehicle that was
more versatile than the Saturn V and could provide a
routine access to space.
NASA responded by designing the space shuttle which
consisted of a reusable orbiter (much like an airplane)
that could carry the crew and payload, and used a two-
stage propulsion system -- the space shuttle maip
engines (SSME's) and the solid rocket boosters (SRB's_:
The SSME' s are engines fueled by liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen which is stored in the external tank (ET).
The SRB's consist of solid rocket motors (SRM's)
which are fueled by solid propellant. Until the Space
Shuttle Program, manned vehicles had not used solid
rocket propellant due to its inability to be tested before
use and to be shut down in the event of in-flight
problems. All components of the space shuttle, with the
exception of the ET, are reusable (Appendix A). The
Space Shuttle Program was originally planned to
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provide 60 flights a year at program maturity. Capabil-
ity was finally established at 24 flights per year. The
funded manifest through year 2000, almost twenty
years after the first flight, actually plans for less than 12
flights per year.
On April 12, 1981, the first space shuttle roared off the
pad for a two-day mission. During the next five years,
24 missions would be flown with few problems. How-
ever, the space shuttle was not approaching the flight
rate promised Congress, and cost overruns had existed
since the outset of the program. Schedule and budget
pressures were mounting, and NASA was finding it
difficult to meet the goals of the Space Shuttle
Program.
On January 28, 1986, after many delays, the Space
Shuttle Challenger (Mission 5 I-L) was poised to lift
off. There was much concern expressed by both NASA
and Morton Thiokol, Inc. (SRM contractor) engineers
over the unusually cold weather (below freezing) at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The experience base
relative to the O-rings (seals), where the SRM
segments were joined (field joints), did not include
data on retention of hot gases at temperatures below
40 degrees Fahrenheit.
The decision was made to launch and 73 seconds into
the flight, the entire Challenger vehicle was lost in an
explosion. All seven astronauts on board were killed.
This brought the Space Shuttle Program to a complete
halt until the cause could be determined and corrected.
A Presidential Commission was appointed. Four months
later, it reported that the SRM joint leak was the cause
of the accident and that the joint required redesign. It
took NASA two and one-half years to redesign, test,
and certify the new j0int, comply with the other recom-
mendations offered by the commission, and return to
flight. 3
Another issue that surfaced out of the Challenger
investigation was the concern of having only one
contractor and production site as a source for the SRM.
NASA was directed to develop an alternate SRM
source that would deliver an advanced solid rocket
motor (ASRM) with enhanced safety and payload
capability. NASA responded by issuing a Request for
Proposal for an ASRM to be manufactured at a Gov-
ernment Owned--Contractor Operated (GOCO)
facility. The site for the GOCO facility was a partially
completed, abandoned Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) nuclear facility located near Iuka, Mississippi,
called the Yellow Creek site. MSFC awarded a con-
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tractforASRMproductionandfacilitydevelopmentin
Mayof 1989totheLockheed/Aerojett am.
TheASRMprojectisMSFC'smostrecentprogram.
Startingaprojectof thismagnitude(over$2billionin
thenexttenyears)undercurrenteconomiconditions
is difficult.Developinga secondsourcefor a space
vehicleisnotacommonpractice.Thisprogramcontin-
uestomeetoppositionbecausehundredsofmillionsof
dollarswerespentimprovingtheThiokolCorporation
redesignedsolidrocketmotor(RSRM).It hasbeen
improvedtotheextenthatit isacompetitor.It offers
virtually the sameproductastheASRM (lessthe
performancegain) and is aggressivelypursuinga
programof reducedvariability(fig. 1,page4). In
strategicbusinessterms,statisticalprocesscontroland
otherTQM-relatedelementsarebeingusedbyThiokol
as "preemptivemeasures"to stopthecompetition
beforeit starts?To furthercomplicatethe issue,a
NASA commissiononspacegoalsrecentlyrecom-
mendedthatNASAdecreaseits dependencyon the
spaceshuttlebyplacingmoreemphasisonunmanned
vehicles,someof whichdonotusesolidpropellant
technology.5
Fromthe beginningof the SpaceShuttleProgram
(1969tothepresentday),NASAfundingandincreases
to fundinghavebeendifficultto obtain.Withbudget
deficits,SavingsandLoansbailouts,otherdomestic
problems,foreigncompetition,andawarintheMiddle
East,it hasbecomeimperativefor companiesand
governmentagenciesto increaseproductivityand
qualitywhilereducingormaintainingcost.Mostcom-
paniesthathavesurvivedthe suppressedeconomic
environmentimplementedsomeformof "TQM" or
"ContinuousImprovement"program.Experiencing
thesamepressuresasothercompanies/government
agencies,MSFCmanagementrealizedthatit mustalso
dothesame.
Thecurrentatmosphereisoneinwhichtheoldwayof
doingbusinesscouldresultin thecancellationof the
ASRMProject.Theuseof TQMprincipleson the
ASRM Projectis essentialfor survival.Program
successwouldserveasatestimonyto otherprojects
andorganizationsthatTQMworks,provideanexample
of a"petuniain theonionpatch,"(fig. 2,page5)and
beginaculturechangeatMSFC.•
The Onion Patch Strategy
Whatcanbedonewhenyourcompany'stop managers
are notquality leadersand champions?When you are
a lone quality championwithout the support of top
leadership- a "lonely little petuniainan onion patch"?n
In general,the onion patchstrategy is: 'q'hink big, but
stay close to your roots." Select improvement efforts
within your span of control--but select improvements
that capturethe attention of people at least two links
up inthe chainof command.Look for projects with "big
dollar" implications. For example,projects th.at reduce
waste or rework, or increasesalesor revenue.Concen-
trate your efforts on achieving the kind of results that
the others, eventhe skeptics,will respect. Includeother
people in your efforts. Include even more people in the
sharing of creditfor a successful job. Build a network
of believersandsupporterswhileyou makereal improve-
ments in the system.
Sometimesyou will have direct supervisory respon-
sibilityoverpeopleinvolvedin improvementefforts.Ifso,
shield them from outside pressures so that they can
continuethe work of improving quality.
Bepatientandpersistent. Ifyou succeedyou maycre-
ate opportunities to introducethe wider implications of
quality to higher and higher levels of the organization.
Meanwhile, preparefor any opportunities. Be ready to
pounce when a moverand shaker asks for information
or suggestions. Haveat hand copiesof books, articles,
orvideotapesofvarious lengthsthataresuitableintroduc-
tory materialsfor your managers.
Havepreparedanintroductorypresentationthat isflex-
ible enough to fit time slots ranging from 15 to 90
minutes. Haveyour presentation rehearsedand ready
to go. Include, among your presenters,hourly opera-
tors who have becomezealots for the new way. They
neednot beslick or articulate. Their excitement will be
eloquenceenough.
Identifythe most commonquestionsor objectionsand
bepreparedto respondto them. Figureout ways to per-
suadeyour managersto hear the quality leadersspeak.
Compile success stories. Preparethem in a "picture
book" format that is easy to follow and loaded with
graphics. Askthe resisters to helpout on some quality
activity.
The onion patchtransformer must keep in mind that
his or herefforts should always begearedto gettingthe
attention of top management,educatingthem, andmak-
ingbelieversandchampionsof them. Withouttheir even-
tual buy-in, all of your transformation efforts will wither
onthe vine.
ReprintedfromQualityProar_ July1988,"BeginningtheQuality
Transformation,PartI, "byPeterR.ScholtesandHeeroHacquebord.
Figure 2
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QM--Background and Definition
TQM is the application of quantitative methods and
human resources operating in a supportive cultural
environment to continuously improve and control
product quality and performance of the enterprise.
Accepted TQM elements will be used to define TQM
in this section. The background of TQM and the
evolution to its current form will be discussed.
The genesis of the government-wide interest in TQM
arose from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) draft circular shown in Appendix B. If the draft
circular had progressed to a directive, each govern-
ment agency's compliance would have been required.
Consequently, the OMB would have been obligated to
provide funding to each agency to study, plan, and
implement effective TQM programs. The draft nevei:
became a directive and has since been withdrawn. It
appears that there is no current polarizing force cham-
pioning a top-level government-wide requirement to
implement TQM.
In response to the OMB draft circular, NASA Head-
quarters issued NASA Management Instruction (NMI)
1270.2 shown in Appendix C. MSFC developed Man-
agement Announcement (MA) 1150.1A (Appendix D)
and readily established an Executive Steering Council,
tasking it to study different programs, approaches, and
training courses for a TQM program. The membership
of the council appears to be at a sufficiently high level
to assure support by upper management. The ultimate
goal of the Executive Steering Council is to produce
changes resulting in the type of management that
generates the increased quality, productivity, and cus-
tomer awareness essential in the space program.
According to Joseph M. Juran, all quality improvement
takes place project by project and in no other way.
Project is defined as a problem scheduled for solu-
tion -- a specific mission to be carried out. The first
step in mobilizing for the projects collectively is to
establish a quality council or committee to launch,
coordinate, and institutionalize annual quality im-
provement. If no such council is in existence, the top
managers should create one. Upper managers should
personally become the leaders and members of the
senior quality council.6 Therefore, it appears that the
creation and charter of the Executive Steering Council
was on target.
TQM, a phrase coined by the Japanese, is being pro-
moted throughout the govemment as the panacea to
bureaucratic, matrix, and other cumbersome organiza-
tional forms. TQM has potential, but management
philosophy fads such as Management by Objectives,
Zero Defects, and Quality Circles have come and gone
at MSFC. Quality Circles, for example, in most indus-
tries and government agencies have failed because
management was confused over the purpose of this
management technology. Managers were generally in
search of "a way to fix" problems and discovered
Quality Circles. Accounts were heralded of improved
employee morale and true involvement. Confusion
about the purpose of Quality Circles (and eventually
their failure) began as both industrial and government
managers tried to increase participation without
releasing control. The groups chosen for Quality Circles
were eventually only allowed to work on problems
selected by managers. Misuse of a management tech-
nology will fail (be a fad).7 If TQM is misused at
MSFC, it will be the newest fad, and it will fail.
During interviews with ASRM management, it was
generally recognized that the ASRM culture should be
highly supportive of TQM. This culture would repre-
sent a shift from the MSFC culture. ASRM's contrac-
tors have already been directed I_odevelop TQM ap-
proaches (Appendix E) and ASRM personnel will be
expected to support the approach.
TQM program status is difficult to assess at the agency,
MSFC and ASRM Project levels. During Quality Month
(October 1990) activities, TQM was given ample con-
sideration in public meetings and printed media at
MSFC. In the three months following October, there
were no TQM banners, posters, logos, or newsletters.
Some visibility resulted from the annual MSFC calen-
dar stating commitment to "Continuous Improvement"
and a TQM Colloquium airing for two hours in Janu-
ary. This could be indicative of the infancy of the
program. It could also mean that managers envision
another management technology that is doomed for
failure, or that the current TQM effort is not in earnest.
One way to evaluate the extent to which management
is seriously attempting TQM is to gauge on-going
activities relative to accepted definitions. There are of
course as many definitions and vision statements for
PRE'CEDiNG PAGE E;LAI'_t( NOT FILMED
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TQM as there are businesses that are claiming to be
implementing programs. MSFC and ASRM do not
appear to have satisfied the basis for a TQM Plan--a
clear and concise statement of fundamental organiza-
tion-wide guiding principles for all employees. NASA
and MSFC rely on NMI 1270.2 and MA i 150.1A to
outline the TQM program's intent.
Some industries and government agencies use catch-
all program descriptions as guiding principles. The
Department of Defense (DoD) adopted the following
definition of TQM:
Organized continuous process improvement
activities involving everyone in an organiza-
tion-managers and workersuin a totally
integrated effort toward improving perfor-
mance at every level. This improved
performance is directed toward satisfying such
cross-functional goals as quality, cost, sched-
ule, mission, need, and suitability. Total Quality
Management integrates fundamental manage-
ment techniques, existing improvement
efforts, and technical tools under a disciplined
approach focused on continuous process
improvement. These activities are ultimately
focused on increased customer/user satisfac-
tion .8
It is difficult to arrive at one definition that adequately
covers the scope of such comprehensive endeavors.
For example, the OMB draft circular def'mes TQM as:
A total, integrated organizational approach for
meeting customer needs and expectations that
involves all managers and employees and uses
quantitative methods and employee involve-
ment to improve continuously the
organization's processes, products and ser-
vices. 9
An equally comprehensive description used by many
companies would offer TQM as:
A systematic approach to productivity
improvement using objective methods and all
employees to continuously improve the qual-
ity of all products and services. 1°
According to MA 1150.1A (Appendix D) the MSFC
definition states:
Continuous Process Improvement is a man-
agement philosophy/operating methodology
totally committed to:
8
a. Continuing improvement of allprocesses
and products
b. Satisfaction of internal and external
customer needs
c. Universal participation and teamwork.
The definitions generally use the same words as most
TQM program descriptions. They do not, however,
delineate the vision and how it will be achieved. More
appropriate would be a detailed exposition of the
means intended to employ and achieve a clearly stated
vision. This would lead to an organizational culture
that supports TQM and not a set of procedures written
down and filed.
For purposes of analyzing TQM at MSFC and particu-
larly in the ASRM Project, the models shown in figures
3 and 4 and the information shown in figures 5 through
7 will be used. Figure 3, "The Foundations of TQM"
identifies the major elements of TQM, all operating in
a supportive cultural environment. It highlights the fact
that TQM is the application of quantitative methods
and human resources to control and improve product
quality and performance of the enterprise. Figure 4
(page 9), "The Westbrook Model for Engineering
Management" acknowledges that there are many inter-
actions and influences that naturally occur in the work
environment. These influences can be external or inter-
nal, both affecting performance. The external
environment has been the traditional focus involving
the competition, paying customers, and governing
The Foundations of TQM
Supportive Cultural Environment
SPC - Statistical Process Control
QC - Quality Control
Figure 3
2o
Westbrook Model for
Engineering Management
Competition Systems cu,tur 
[ Agencies I (Organization) ! Management I
Customers _ Behavioral Theory / Customers ]
. (Sens t vity to . .
\ Suppliers _ (ivSeot_i iotyt/ / Policies /
Figure 4
forces. The internal environment and its effects on the
organization is the contemporary focus. Internal cus-
tomers, culture, and employee involvement are a few
of the major forces that affect performance when the
internal environment is considered. At the core of the
Westbrook model is the appropriate structure for orga-
nization, strategic plan, management systems (like
TQM), and human resources management. Both models
indicate that an internal environment must exist to
attend the needs of the motivated individual in a Total
Quality Company.
Figure 5, "TQM Definition" clearly distills and simply
states the intent of the models shown in figures 3 and
4 and is offered as a potential ASRM definition of
TQM principles. Figure 6 (page 10), "Typical Features
That Identify Cultures" identifies the most significant
aspects of a culture. Understanding what composes a
belief system is the key to unlocking the changes
sought through TQM. Figure 7 (page 10) compares
Eastern and Western approaches to continuous im-
provement, according to the Japanese viewpoint. Kaizen
(Japanese term for continuous improvement) usually
involves unsophisticated techniques while the West-
err, approach usually features surges in technology,
spurts of fast change and high investments.
TQM Definition
Elements Required for a Total Quality Company
• Organization-wide focus on quality
• Continuous improvement
• Extensive use of measurement (statistics)
• Cross-functional teams solving
organizational problems
• Increased sensitivity to and focus on
customer needs
Figure 5
Since the day an idea sparked the drafting of the now
nonexistent OMB circular, many definitions and inter-
pretations of TQM have been contrived. As a new
management technology, if TQM is misused, it will be
only a fad and it will fail. TQM principles for the
ASRM will be based on the clearly distilled and simply
stated models. The information contained in figures 3
through 7 will be used as tools to analyze the NASA/
MSFC/ASRM culture and TQM approach. •
Typical Features That Identify Cultures
1. Language
A. Jargon
B. Metaphors
C. Myths
D. Stories
E. Heroes
2. Ceremonies and
celebrations
3. Artifacts and symbols
4. Patterns of Behavior
A. Rites and rituals
B. Behavioral norms
C. Beliefs and values
D. Subcultures
Tends to attack intruders and defends existing culture
Based on tradition and used to promote unity
Silently sends a message about how welcome a new person or
situation is
The reinforcements to the way we act that counter change
Figure 6
Features of Kaizen and Innovation
1. Effect
2. Pace
3. Timeframe
4. Change
5. Involvement
6. Approach
7. Mode
8. Spark
9. Practical
requirements
10. Effort
orientation
11. Evaluation
12. Advantage
Kaizen
Long-term and long-lasting but
undramatic
Small steps
Continuous and incremental
Gradual and constant
Everybody
Collectivism, group efforts, systems
approach
Maintenance and improvement
Conventional know-how and
state-of-the-art
Requires little investment but great
effort to maintain it
People
Process and efforts for better results
Works well in slow-growth economy
Figure 7
Innovation
Short-term but dramatic
Big Steps
Intermittent and non-incremental
Abrupt and volatile
Select few "champions"
Rugged individualism, individual
ideas and efforts
Scrap and rebuild
Technological breakthroughs,
new inventions, new theories
Requires large investment
but little effort to maintain it
Technology
Results for profits
Better suited to fast-growth economy
l0
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Total Quality Management Status
To gain an understanding of how TQM is being imple-
mented in the ASRM Project, one must also understand
the culture, organizations, and systems at MSFC. This
section will offer an explanation of the organizational
forms and management systems for both MSFC and
ASRM. Also, various surveys and studies recently
completed that pertain to statusing TQM will be
described.
The culture of MSFC is typical of aerospace organiza-
tions that are responsible for the design and manufacture
of unique hardware for specific applications. The ma-
jority of managers are engineers or scientists with
limited management training. According to statements
made in the personnel interviews, most became moti-
vated to "move into management to achieve a higher
pay scale," not solely to manage people or projects.
Career development at MSFC offers a limited number
of paths, each with difficult crossover. Broadening
activities are encouraged but not the lateral experience
for horizontal growth. _ It was stated in one interview
that "most engineers are promoted into management
based on their technical ability." New managers do not
begin management training for the new assignment
until months after the position is taken.
Organizational Forms
MSFC is organized in a matrix form in the following
areas: Staff Offices, Project Offices, Science and Engi-
neering Directorate (S&E), Program Development,
and Institutional and Program Support (I&PS) (fig. 8,
page 12). The Staff Offices are the Center Director,
Legal, Equal Opportunity Office, Comptroller, Per-
sonnel, Public Affairs, and Safety and Mission
Assurance (S&MA), formerly Safety, Reliability,
Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA).
Program Development formulates and develops new
programs and is much like a Research and Development
(R&D) organization found in industry. I&PS consists
of Facilities, Procurement, and Information Systems.
S&MA provides oversight of the quality control and
quality assurance activities at the manufacturing sites,
vendors, suppliers, and for MSFC in-house projects.
S&E provides design overview, technical support,
technology development, and problem resolution
capability similar to engineering organizations in the
commercial sector. The above mentioned organiza-
tions are support or R&D for the Project Offices.
The most identifiable matrix is the relationship to the
Project Office by the S&E Directorate. The Project
Office is product oriented (i.e., ASRM) and S&E is
functionally oriented (i.e., Materials and Processes
Laboratory). The Project Office consists of the Project
Manager (and Deputy) and Project Control (resources
and schedules) and is the primary MSFC interface to
the contractor. S&E provides the project with a techni-
cal support organization, the Chief Engineer's Office.
It serves as the technical interface between the project,
contractor and S&E laboratories and is co-located with
the Project Office personnel. However, the Chief En-
gineers report organizationally to the Deputy Director
of S&E. Also co-located with the Project Office are
Procurement, Facilities (ASRM only), and S&MA
(fig. 9, page 13).
The ASRM Chief Engineers' Office is organized in
three groups: (1) Systems Engineering and Integration,
(2) Design and Development, and (3) Productivity
Engineering (fig. 10, page 14). Each group has a chief
and five (5) engineers.
The Systems Engineering and Integration group's pri-
mary functions are logistics, support equipment,
integration of the ASRM with other space shuttle
components, and interfacing with KSC and JSC opera-
tions. Their interfaces are primarily outside MSFC.
The Design and Development Engineering group's
primary functions are to oversee the design, develop-
ment, and test of all ASRM components (i.e., nozzle,
case). They are organized by product and most of this
group's functions are within MSFC.
The Productivity Engineering group assigns four engi-
neers to work manufacturing, production and
information systems and one to serve as the resident
engineer at the Yellow Creek site. The three that work
manufacturing and production are organized function-
ally in the following areas: Production/Facilities
Integration, Tooling/Production Automation, and
Manufacturing Processes. Like the Design and Devel-
opment group, most of the Productivity Engineering
group's functions are within MSFC.
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The Design and Development group and Productivity
Engineering group interface with each other on a daily
basis. This can be difficult because the two groups are
matrixed to each other. This creates a division of labor,
a feature typically found in a bureaucracy, where
things sometimes go unattended or done twice. When
the Chief Engineer's Office has a meeting with S&E
concerning a product, usually one person from Design
and Development supports it while up to three people
from Productivity Engineering are needed. This uti-
lizes most of Productivity Engineering's resources
while their actual productive time in the meeting is low.
Having a matrix within the Chief Engineer's Office
(Project Office) matrixed to the S&E Directorate,
creates a "matrix within a matrix".
The management system for ASRM is the traditional
MSFC chain of command. Until recently S&E person-
nel have not been allowed to sign inter-center memos.
All extemai memos still must be signed by the Labora-
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tory Director. Each laboratory has at least one lead
engineer for each project. All information concerning
that particular project is sent through the laboratory
lead. This adds another layer of management control
through which information or approval must be passed
to reach the appropriate personnel. Following the chain
of command process from the working level engineer
in the laboratory to a working level engineer in the
Chief Engineer's Office can go through as many as
seven (7) layers of managers.
Survey and Study Data Base
The MSFC Productivity Improvement Office and the
Executive Steering Council recently administered a
number of surveys to establish a clear understanding of
existing culture, morale and employee perception of
TQM status. These surveys serve as a "benchmark," a
required activity when beginning TQM. The organiza-
tion seeking change cannot know which direction to
take or what to change without knowing which current
positions, attitudes, and cultural barriers to change.
The first survey was the 1989 Culture Study and was
intended to measure morale at MSFC. A consultant
compiled the results and presented to MSFC manage-
ment that morale was generally good and the results
compared favorably with other NASA Centers. The
survey avoided a comparison to industry in the area.
The results were also compared to the 1986 morale
survey, one that was taken in the timeframe soon after
the Challenger accident and among employees who
have since retired. The results of the survey, in presen-
tation form, are shown in Appendix F.
The second survey was the TQM Benchm_k Assess-
ment. It was fashioned after the one used in the "Malcolm
B_ldridge Award" and was designed to solicit manag-
ers' estimates of the status of TQM implementation at
MSFC. During one interview, it was observed that
"managers with a higher degree of TQM awareness
rated the MSFC progress lower and more objectively."
The survey and results are shown in Appendix G.
Other ad hoc studies have been sponsored by the
Executive Steering Council. One is the MSFC
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Communication Study which involved a cross-func-
tional team that compiled data through surveys and
interviews. The results highlighted the fact that com-
munication at MSFC is not completely effective.
Contributors to poor communication, as presented to
management by the study team were: chain of com-
mand, low use of electronic media, managers who are
not people-oriented, and managers who use "not
sharing information" as a method of retaining power.
The results of this study are shown in Appendix H.
Another comprehensive ad hoc study was recently
completed which addressed, in depth, the problems
with the MSFC procurement system. This is a signifi-
cant area to study, as it dramatically affects
supportability to the project office. "Findings included
burdensome overregulation, centralized authority and
unnecessary signature cycles," as stated during inter-
views with members of the study team. The results of
the study are shown in Appendix I.
A series of interviews was conducted by the authors
that solicited TQM-related commentary from key
personnel at MSFC who frequently interface with the
ASRM Project. Those interviewed included MSFC top
management, support organizations, a union official
and ASRM management. Many of the statements of-
fered by those interviewed are used as supporting
references and illustrations herein. Those interviewed
are listed in Appendix J.
Finally, a brief questionnaire was used within ASRM
to determine motivational principles in use across the
project's supporting functions. Based on the content of
14
individualresponses,over50percentof therespon-
dentsto the"MotivationalPrinciplesin Use"survey
wereunfamiliarwith11ofthe16morecommonlyused
principles.Forty-five(45)percentof therespondents
donotuseanyof the16principlesand64percentof
themusetwoorless.Thequestionnaireandasummary
of theresultsareshowninAppendixK.
MSFCmanagementis ryingtodevelopaclearviewof
its culture, strengths, and weaknesses. Through the
studies and surveys, the status of TQM is now becom-
ing known. Results from the studies and surveys will be
used in conjunction with defined TQM elements for the
analysis and evaluation of TQM philosophies for
ASRM. •
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nalysis and Evaluation
II
In analyzing the TQM Implementation Strategy for the
ASRM project, "The Foundations of TQM" (fig. 3,
page 8) and the "Westbrook Model for Engineering
Management" (fig. 4, page 9) will serve as visual
references. The definition of TQM as shown in figure
5 (page 9) and cultural elements shown in figure 6
(page 10) will serve as criteria throughout the analysis
and evaluation.
Organizational-Wide
Focus on Quality
For years NASA prided itself on its "can do" attitude.
During the Apollo days, scientists and engineers took
pride in their products and felt responsible for them.
However, as the Space Shuttle Program evolved,
accountability traditionally assumed by the Civil Ser-
vice employees and the accompanying work force
shifted to the contractors who built the components. 12
Civil servants became contract monitors instead of
actual "hands-on" experts. During the interviews many
stated that, "Civil servants not maintaining hands-on
expertise has eroded their knowledge of the products
and processes."
One of the recommendations from the Challenger
Accident Investigation Team was to form a "blanket"
organization to be responsible for safety, reliability,
maintainability, and quality assurance. 13This organi-
zation, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA), reports
directly to the NASA Administrator and is given full
authority to stop any launch or any activity that does
not adhere to specification, procedural requirements or
accepted quality control practices.
Perception is reality until the perception is changed.
This organization is perceived, however as trying to
"inspect-in quality" rather than "ceasing dependence
on inspection," as stated in Dr. W. Edwards Deming's
third point? 4 In a recent Space Shuttle Projects Staff
Meeting, for example,top NASA managers discussed
budgeting for more inspectors and quality auditors,
giving unknowing Senators and Congressmen the feel-
ing that NASA is "buying more quality". This attitude
is most visible when latent defects are found and
S&MA is asked why they were not detected. Manufac-
turing should be asked why the defects were made in
the first place.
As stated in one interview, "not everyone in the ASRM
Project understands S&MA' s role nor their own role in
product quality." A clear understanding of S&MA's
role is essential in implementing an organization-wide
focus on quality.
Continuous Improvement
In the context of TQM, "improvement" means the
organized creation of beneficial change; the attain-
ment of unprecedented levels of performance. Its
synonym is "breakthrough". _5There is much debate as
to whether Japanese management techniques are
superior to those practiced in America. Regardless of
the debate, the Japanese viewpoint is that the Eastern
and Western approaches to Kaizen (Continuous
Improvement) are different. As listed in figure 7 (page
10), there are 12 features that the Japanese say
distinguish the approaches. The Eastern management
culture favors the Kaizen column, primarily support-
ing simple, conventional techniques. The Western
culture favors sophisticated techniques and state-of-
the-art technologies, expressed in terms of innovations.16
The Japanese viewpoint fails to mention that it took 20
years to create the supportive culture, technology base,
and infrastructure to only need continuous
improvement.
In most respects the "innovation" column in figure 7
(page 10) accurately describes MSFC improvement
approaches to date. The NASA culture is obsessed
with technology, new inventions, and new theories.
These are intermittent and non-incremental, resulting
from individual ideas and efforts. Without "champions,"
the dramatic results obtained from the new technolo-
gies would never be realized. Although large
investments are required, large paybacks result. Ac-
cording to members of the MSFC Productivity Office,
the MSFC Productivity Enhancement Complex is
designed to achieve this goal. The MSFC approach is
used to eliminate specific problems in develop-
ment and production of hardware, which is produced in
low quantities and that undergo the rigors of space
flight. The global debate for Kaizen versus innovation
probably favors Kaizen, but for the survival of the
aerospace business, innovations are essential.
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Without deliberate change, the ASRM management
culture will follow in the footsteps of MSFC and other
projects. ASRM could easily come to rely only on
technology innovations without realizing the added
benefits of continuous improvement techniques.
Breaking away from tradition and structuring a culture
that uses the best features of both approaches offers
obvious advantages. Over the next 20 years, commit-
ment to more than the success of missions will be
required. Teamwork, employee empowerment, reduced
perception of rugged individualism, and collective
efforts will generate a management style that is com-
petitive globally. ASRM would have a style that
distinguishes it from other projects like the "petunia in
the onion patch".
Extensive Use of Measurements
MSFC is predominantly a technical organization, com-
pletely comfortable with numbers relating to vehicle
design, performance, statistics, cost, and schedule.
When it comes to measurement of productivity of that
same organization, it is pushed outside its comfort
zone. MSFC (including ASRM) management tends to
be more results-oriented than process-oriented in their
measurements.
Results-oriented management is defined as the style of
management that is well established in the U.S. which
deals at the bottom line. It emphasizes controls, perfor-
mance, results and rewards (or the denial of rewards
and even penalties). These criteria are easily quantifi-
able and short term. 17
Process-oriented management is the style of manage-
ment that is people-oriented and that deals with how
results are obtained, much in contrast to styles oriented
solely toward results. In process-oriented management
employees are provided a supportive cultural environ-
ment in which to do their jobs. Such a style of
management calls for a long-term outlook and usually
requires a behavioral change, Some criteria for merit-
ing rewards in this style are discipline, time,
management, skill developmert, participation and
involvement, morale, and communication? s
During interviews, it was stated that "MSFC cultivates
predominantly bottom-line managers." They use
mechanistic controls (award fee, performance evalua-
tions) and numerical goals (dollars, schedules,
production quotas) to control and evaluate their projects.
The MSFC Culture Study (Appendix F) supports this
where respondents believe that accomplishing goals is
the best way effectiveness is measured. Contracts for
these programs, including ASRM, are written to
accommodate this type of management philosophy.
This is partially due to the environment created by
Congress in federally funded programs.
If ASRM managers are to depart from their dominant
MSFC culture and become more process-oriented, the
focus must be on how goals are accomplished, people,
processes, and quality. Management must clearly
define goals and then provide support to the people
who accomplish them. If non-value added impediments
exist in accomplishing goals, it is management's job to
remove them. Many of those interviewed stated the
"people should be regarded as valuable assets that will
depreciate if continuous training is not received and if
proper care is not taken with respect to their achieve-
ment needs." When an employee has been allowed to
become fully motivated and trained, the employee's
potential can only be released with empowerment to do
the work assignment. The results often surpass the
expectations of management. A manager should never
underestimate the potential of the organization's most
valuable resource--people.
In accordance with figure 3 (page 8), people using tools
and methods result in Statistical Process Control (SPC).
First the people involved must be qualified through
education and continued training. They should be
current with technology and be able to apply the correct
tools to the work situation, such as the graphs, plots,
and control charts shown in Appendices E and M. Then
management must freely provide these tools, methods,
techniques, and technologies and fully expect their use.
TQM is not only control elements like methods and
tools but also people using them to solve problems.
The lack of process control in manufacturing is one of
the most prevalent problems in the U.S. today.19 Projects
like ASRM are no different. Project Office personnel
rarely take the time to fully understand the processes
used for manufacturing a product such as the ASRM,
yet management continually expresses interest in higher
productivity. One of the first lessons learned in imple-
menting TQM is that productivity is not possible
without first establishing quality. There is nothing
productive about scrap and rework. The lesson continues
with the reality that quality does not exist until the
process is under control, reducing variability for product
uniformity.
SPC is becoming more than just a buzzword. As people
begin to understand SPC, they must understand which
variables require control and to what degree. To
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determinethese,sometypeof experimentaldesign
(i.e.,FractionFactorial,Taguchi)isbestusedinorder
to optimize the processes and products.
Some well-established projects within the Shuttle
Projects Office that are considered to have successful
products (relative to cost, schedule, and performance)
measure quality trends at a very high level. Appendix
L is an example of information contained in the monthly
performance trends report for one such project. Very
high-level reporting methods are typical across most
MSFC projects. Discrepancies are measured in terms
of 1,000 hours worked--a relationship unsupported
by modem SPC techniques. Also, the number of latent
defects reported clearly shows that 100 percent inspec-
tion does not produce 100 percent quality. With SPC on
the horizon, reporting methods will necessarily change
to reflect product variability as opposed to unrelated
factors.
One more example of the ASRM project being a
"lonely petunia in the onion patch" will be work station
level process control at the manufacturing site. The
ASRM project is structured to use a high degree of
automation and real-time process control. Operators
well trained in control techniques will occupy each
work station and clearly display the control charts for
the process. This would represent a departure from the
current practice of high-level "looks" that depend on
low-level "tight tolerances" to keep the product within
specification. ASRM quality trends will appropriately
represent an upward flow of work station information.
Other projects will probably continue to "measure with
a micrometer and cut with an ax". Other projects will
probably continue to claim real progress in SPC; a
claim without foundation until process control charts
are routinely displayed at each work station.
The ASRM contractors will use a five-phase
process control program: development, characteriza-
tion, verification, control, and improvement. This
program provides the employees with the tools to reach
their goals and continuously improve. Statistical tools
such as cause-and-effect (Ishikawa) diagrams, control
charts (X-bar and R), quality spread sheets, histograms,
Pareto diagrams, scatterplots, flowcharts, and graphs
represent many of the tools available for the employee
to understand and control their processes. 2° It will be
imperative that ASRM Chief Engineer personnel,
support S&E personnel and S&MA representatives
understand and be able to utilize the tools being
employed by their ASRM contractor counterparts.
Appendix M contains examples of specific techniques
for design requirements, such as Quality Function
Deployment (QFD), and the process control program
planned by the ASRM contractors.
NASA has promoted quality for years, especially since
the Challenger accident. ASRM will express quality in
terms of"tight product uniformity around a target" and
not as "conformance to specs". With training based on
methods from Deming, Juran, Taguchi, and others,
employees will understand why controlling the
process is important to the design and performance of
their product.
Cross-Functional Teams Solving
Organizational Problems
Teams at MSFC are primarily functional teams like
NASA Employee Teams (NET's) which are chartered
to solve problems in their specific organization.
Private industry knows these teams as Quality Circles.
The word "team" is often used to describe an organiza-
tion like the "Shuttle Projects Team". The only true,
cross-functional teams are those ad hoc teams or"Tiger
Teams" which are formed to solve a specific problem
when the existing organization cannot react in an
acceptable timeframe. These ad hoc organizations have
an unbelievable track record of success. Participation
on such a team is usually one of the more memorable
experiences in one's career because an "adhocracy" is
relieved of organizational boundaries, certain policies,
and are rewarded for successful completion.
In order to examine teamwork in the ASRM Project,
both the contractor and NASA organizations must be
examined. The contractors (Lockheed, Aerojet, Thiokol,
Babcock & Wilcox and Rust) utilize cross-functional
teams called Product Development Teams (PDT). They
are completely responsible for the design and manu-
facture of their specific product and the product's
facility design and activation (fig. 11, page 20). The
PDT's are designed to satisfy both internal and external
customers. These teams meet on a weekly basis with an
open invitation to NASA personnel to attend as observ-
ers. Contractual requirements do not allow NASA
personnel to be members of a PDT.
During interviews, concern was expressed over the
way the PDT's operate and the way NASA interfaces
with the PDT's. This can be attributed to three reasons:
(1) PDT's have only been established for just over a
year in which the majority of the PDT personnel have
been transferred to Iuka, Mississippi, (2) ASRM
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personnel have not organized or been trained to effec-
tively use teamwork, and (3) team outputs are hard to
control. All will improve with time, training, exposure,
and experience.
As previously mentioned, the ASRM Project does not
routinely utilize cross-functional teamwork. This is
primarily due to the fact that teams are not viewed as a
viable means of management. ASRM (and MSFC)
must use teamwork to maximize the utilization of its
people. The use of teams would be particularly helpful
in the ASRM Project to complement the contractor's
PDT's whose members interface with NASA person-
nel on a daily or weekly basis.
Customer Focus
Increased sensitivity to and focus on customer needs is
one of the most important and pressing requirements
for a Total Quality Company. Without this constancy
of purpose, no company is likely to succeed in a
competitive environment.
According to Juran, a customer is anyone who receives
or is affected by the product or process. Customers may
be external or internal.
"External customers" are affected by the product but
are not members of the company that produces the
product. External customers include clients who buy
the product, government regulatory bodies and the
public (which may be affected by unsafe products or
damage to the environment).
"Internal customers" are affected by the product and
are also members of the company that produces the
product. They are often called customers despite the
fact that they are not customers in the dictionary sense;
that is, they are not clients. However, they receive an
output from a person, group, or internal organization. 2_
In further discussions, Juran says that product satisfac-
tion is a result achieved when product features respond
to customer needs. It is generally synonymous with
customer satisfaction. Product satisfaction is a stimu-
lus to product stability. That is why clients buy the
product.
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A productdeficiencyisaproductfailurethatresultsin
productdissatisfaction.Productdeficienciestake such
forms as power outages, failure to meet delivery dates,
inoperable goods, blemished appearance, and non-
conformance to specification. The major impact is on
the costs incurred to redo prior work and to respond to
customer complaints.
During the interviews, many support organization
directors stated that they were encouraging their man-
agers to identify their customers and have meetings
with them to solve any problems that exist. The
Comptroller's Office, for example, is responsible for
financial activity and considers virtually all MSFC
functions as customers. Rather than being overwhelmed
with the scope of hundreds of interfaces, managers
began meeting with internal customers to eliminate
differences. Reports from their customers indicate a
higher degree of satisfaction with the financial
organization's service over the past year. Although
policies, procedures, and other constraints imposed by
MSFC external customers (from NASA Headquarters
and the OMB) may be difficult to avoid, the internal
customers to the financial organization feel more
comfortable with the ability to influence their destiny.
There are occasions when ASRM Project support orga-
nizations have internal customer conflicts which affect
the ultimate customer. During one interview, it was
stated "there are two organizations with a major pro-
cessing problem that desperately needs resolution".
Procurement and the Engineering Management (EM)
Division of S&E have a complex relationship. EM is
the business management function of S&E that allocates
funding and processes purchase requirements, repre-
senting a sizeable portion of the MSFC in-house activity.
Procurement is the contract representative and is the
only lawfully authorized organization to buy for the
government.
The bureaucratic organizational form at MSFC has
created a tangled relationship. Over the years, the
management of EM has allowed "signature creep". It
now can take as many as fourteen (14) signatures to
approve a purchase request of relatively low dollar
value. This process in itself can take weeks or months
to work through the system, as illustrated in Appendix
I. The relationship between EM and Procurement
becomes tangled when Procurement is required as part
of EM's iterative approval process. The two organiza-
tions are placed in the position of taking turns being
each other's customer. Those organizations have not
been trained in TQM and customer awareness tech-
niques. It is confusing and frustrating to those involved
and the results are counterproductive.
If the EM and Procurement scenario was presented as
a manufacturing problem where a product repeatedly
cycled between operations in a manufacturing cell, the
lost time would not be permitted. It would be too costly.
An analysis would be conducted to optimize flow, set-
up, lead times, and interfaces. The EM and Procurement
scenario is analogous. Fourteen signatures on a routine
purchase wastes valuable human resources and frus-
trates the groups involved. The entire system begs to be
simplified and optimized.
The external customer arrangement for the ASRM
Project is complex in that it is multilayered. ASRM is
designated as Level n-I in the agency hierarchy and is
directly influenced by Level II, which is at Johnson
Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. This hierarchy
includes technical systems integration and budget.
Both Level III and Level II receive direction from
Level I at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Headquarters in turn receives direction from any num-
ber of sources, including the President of the United
States, the Vice-President, Congress, Senate, and an
untold number of special committees.
The ASRM Project is also bound by the policies levied
by other agencies such as the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), the OMB, and even the DoD who
dominates the basic standards and specifications by
which the ASRM is built. The entanglement increases
since these policies, standards, specifications and other
requirements are enforced through the organizations
that support the ASRM Project, like the Comptroller's
Office, Personnel and S&E. It gives them the appear-
ance, but not the legitimate authority, of being a customer
to ASRM. Some personnel interviewed remarked that
this made various support organizations act like
customers, causing resentment among those who dealt
with them. In reality, the support organizations act as
agents to translate policies from governing bodies, and
for a brief period become the customer.
A good example is Personnel, who must regard every
organization as an internal customer. Regulations on
promotions are passed on by the OPM. Personnel
insures that promotions for customers like the ASRM
Project are executed in a timely manner but in accor-
dance with federal law. During the iterative activities
associated with the selection of a promotion candidate,
the project representatives must prepare and submit
documents and forms suitable to the process. Person-
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nelistheinternalcustomerorrecipientofthispackage
fromthepriorprocessandreliesontheASRMProject
to providea qualityproductrequiringno rework.
Althoughit is difficult sometimesto view support
organizationsascustomers,theyarecustomerswhen
theprocessis iterative.
AslongasgoverningagenciesoutsideNASA'scontrol
enforceregulationsthroughsupportorganizations,all
organizationswill be customersat timesand will
respondto customerneedsat othertimes.It will be
importantto beableto distinguishwhichis which,at
whattime,andbehaveaccordingly.
Customerrecognitionandsensitivityto needshould
beoneof thefirstareasoffocusinTQMtrainingand
oneof thefirsttargetsforbehavioralmodification.As
Jurandescribedit, customerawarenesswouldrepre-
sentadramatic ulturechangefor theASRMProject
andits MSFCsupportorganizations,onethatwould
offerunimaginablebenefits.
Culture
The ASRM cultural analysis criteria is contained in
figure 6 (page 10). Since the ASRM Project recently
began, its culture is still dominated by the MSFC belief
system and infrastructure. Therein exists the opportu-
nity to adopt only those cultural aspects that favor
TQM. To effectively change the operating mode and
management philosophy of any organization, a clear
understanding of the culture is necessary. In accor-
dance with information obtained through the refer-
enced surveys, studies, and interviews with key per-
sonnel, the MSFC culture is explained in the context of
figure 6. Those aspects of the MSFC culture that are
expected to impact TQM in the ASRM Project will be
emphasized.
Language
Every culture has a language and its characteristics
help define the existing culture. Since outsiders such as
customers, vendors, and those not in the immediate
business unit usually find difficulty learning the lan-
guage, it serves to attack the intruder.
Of the five primary elements that compose a language,
the jargon used in the culture that surrounds ASRM is
the most influential in maintaining the status quo. The
use of acronyms and abbreviations is a natural part of
any conversation or presentation. In fact, their use is so
popular that an official NASA publication lists some
16,000 approved acronyms. Of course, this represents
only a portion of those used and many emerging
subcultures, such as the ASRM Project, have local
jargon which serves as a communication barrier to
even its closest neighbors. Jargon is sometimes used to
keep outsiders out, inhibiting team building, problem
solving, and communication with customers. It also
holds "change masters" at bay.
A metaphor is the application of a phrase to an object
it does not denote, and is often used in a negative sense.
TQM principles require a high regard for the customer.
The Air Force, for example, is frequently a customer
but certainly overhears the reference "blue suits". This
phrase does not promote a positive relationship with
the customer.
Myths, stories and heroes also serve as part of a
language, reliving events that only those within the
culture can appreciate and idolizing personalities a
newcomer will never know. The favorite story at
Federal Express involves the founder Fred Smith gam-
bling in Las Vegas to save the company's payroll. At
Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) near
Tullahoma, Tennessee one could hear the accounts of
Von Karman starting up the Center wind tunnels by
playing with the switches. For charter members of
MSFC, the adventures of Wernher yon Braun and the
Germans go well with coffee. For new employees the
stories entertain them only once. For outsiders, the
coffee alone is sufficient.
ASRM must change the language to change the
culture. If managers use negative expressions about
customers, it reflects poorly on TQM. Although
acronyms are a way of life for ASRM, a positive
approach to communications will be necessary in a
TQM environment.
Ceremonies and Celebrations
Ceremonies and celebrations serve to keep tradition
alive by lending significance to doing things "the way
we did it last year". In most respects, celebration is
good. AMWAY, for example, survives on its parties to
keep the work force excited. Mary Kay Cosmetics and
IBM celebrate the achievement of sales goals. Mary
Kay goes so far as to reward achievement with fur coats
and pink Cadillacs.
MSFC celebrates certain holidays and anniversaries,
thereby promoting family unity. Also celebrated are
certain achievements. The first astronauts to reach
space and orbit the Earth were milestones well cel-
ebrated. The Apollo Program which resulted in man
walking on the Moon was well celebrated. The
22
successfullaunchof the first space shuttle was good
reason for celebration as it not only signified a techni-
cal achievement but marked the beginning of routine
travel to space. It is interesting to observe that although
each space shuttle launch requires the same technical
achievement as the first, launches have become routine
enough to no longer warrant celebration. In fact as the
solid rocket boosters are spent and jettisoned two
minutes into launch, many SRB personnel leave the
viewing room. "Their job is over" and the other 6.5
minutes of ascent are for others to worry. It is possible
that when celebration of the team's achievement
stopped, so did part of the team's unity. A valuable
lesson learned for the ASRM Project is to consider the
celebration of every successful launch and supporting
other projects on the launch team until orbit is achieved.
Artifacts and Symbols
Artifacts and symbols send a silent and clear message
about the welcomeness of a newcomer or a new
philosophy. Government practices are similar to many
traditional private businesses where executive offices
are lavish, the organization chart is emphasized, and
parking slots are restricted. The ASRM Project will
follow the MSFC culture. Office size will be deter-
mined by position and measured by number of windows,
The organization chart may be simple but will be
structured like all others. One recent attempt to human-
ize some organization charts by replacing the blocks
with color photographs of the managers is a commend-
able improvement and offers a "welcome" to
newcomers. The organization charts that use pictures
of varying sizes to denote rank may not offer the
welcome intended.
The culture introduced by the Japanese is less con-
cerned with bureaucratic symbols. The companies
intensely competing with the Japanese are also elimi-
nating many outdated inhibitors. The Saturn
Corporation in Spring Hill, Tennessee for example,
considers a neck tie unnecessary. The main drive to the
plant was named after the union official who was
instrumental in pioneering new management-labor
concepts employed at Saturn. These are symbols that
send a message of welcome.
Patterns of Behavior
There are several reinforcements to the way one acts
that will counter change. Rites and rituals are infor-
mally observed when things are done the same way
time after time without question. One cultural reality is
the "etched in stone" regard for NMI's and MMI's
(Marshall Management Instructions). These instruc-
tions serve as external influences on the ASRM Project.
It is typical of bureaucratic organizations that these
instructions be put in place by top management for
tight control of operations, many times to the detriment
of cost and performance of a project.
Another cultural reality is that NASA is a part of the
Civil Service System. There are literally thousands of
rules and regulations by which to abide, many relating
to performance evaluation. During the interviews, many
perceived that promotions and certain types of pay
increases had little to do with actual performance.
Leaders in the philosophies and founding principles of
TQM tend to agree with this perception. Deming
recommends abolishing the performance appraisal
system, citing that it destroys initiative and breeds
mediocrity. The performance evaluation process leads
the list of complaints and grievances filed against
management at MSFC. Unfair performance appraisals
are the result of a bureaucratic procedure used for
reporting, inadequate training for supervisors, or both.
The performance appraisal process at MSFC is
cumbersome and lengthy, requiring a lot of the
supervisor's time. Embellishment is usually required
for high ratings. Supervisors seldom feel responsibility
for an employee's low rating, regarding the rating as
the employee's fault. It was expressed during one
interview that the OPM would never approve a
performance appraisal format that could be done on
one page, front and back. An opposing opinion was
stated in another interview that "to be able to do this
would be an improvement as it is hard to get very much
bureaucracy on one sheet of paper".
It is MSFC policy to recruit new hires with a grade
point average of 3.5 or higher whenever possible. If
these outstanding students have been motivated for the
past 17 years to maintain excellent performance in
academics, one would expect their bias toward
achievement to continue and their ratings as employees
to be "outstanding". If the rating is less, the rating
system or the supervisor should be suspect.
Externally motivated rituals are commonplace as they
are passed on to the ASRM Project by the dominant
culture. A good example is the required signing of time
cards for employees who usually charge 40 hours per
week and do not get paid for overtime. Another is
signing travel vouchers that seldom require close scru-
tiny. An interesting example is the signing of leave
slips (vacation authorization). The official purpose is
to inform management that an employee desires time
off on certain days and receive approval for that leave.
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Theleaveslipsareactuallyusedlaterbytheemployee
asevidenceof approval.Althoughtherearenorecent
accountsof managersretractingapprovalirresponsi-
bly,it issuspectedthatthesystemislivingwithsinsof
thepast.Policywaschangedoverayearagotorequire
leaveslipsonly for blocksof threedaysor longer.
Neweremployeesrespondedreadilytotheimproved
conditionswhile long-standingemployeestill sub-
mittedleaveslipsforalloccasions.Suchritualssenda
messageofmutualmistrustbetweenworkersandman-
agement.Onewayto begintheASRMcultureona
positivenoteistoseekoutandeliminateritualssuchas
thesethatarecounterto trustingtheemployee.
A familiarphrasein theculturethatsurroundsthe
ASRMProjectis"shoothemessenger".Thisrefersto
thecertaindemiseof thebearerof badnewsorsome-
onewholocatesaproblemandbringsittomanagement's
attention.In Japaneseindustry,sucha personis an
assettotheproblem-solvingeffort.Thisareaimproved
aftertheChallenger accident. One person interviewed
stated that "ignoring the messenger" is still widely
practiced. "Rewarding the messenger" would be one
measurement of the effectiveness of a culture shift.
Behavioral norms relate to what is perceived to be
accepted behavior. Following the chain of command is
definitely a government-wide expectation, practiced to
the extent that some even wait for permission to do the
obvious. There are also standards of behavior and
speech that are closely followed. For example, upon
reaching certain levels of manager and executive, the
culture assigns the label of "Mr.," "Ms.," or "Dr."
These labels are used to introduce management to
outsiders as well as employees. It is perceived that it
would be outside the acceptable tolerance band of
behavior and speech to use first names, since amanager's
closest employee, the secretary, is usually the one who
leads the introduction with the label and uses it during
conversation. These labels can become a convenient
way for all involved to maintain barriers to open
communication, never having to know someone well
enough for a trusting relationship to develop.
It is being considered that during the next scheduled
rebadging for MSFC personnel, the employee's first
name will be added to the face of the badge. Many
NASA contractors have already taken this step. This
would represent a positive cultural change and send a
message of openness and welcome. If accepted behav-
ior still requires the same labels, the message could be
ambiguous and confusing.
Beliefs and values are justification of norms. One
belief expressed during an interview was that "unless
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you are in S&E, you have no technical competence".
This perception is supported time after time as S&E
engineers move to the project offices and are no longer
regarded as engineers. A statement made during
another interview was that "some non-technical team
members perceive that they are not regarded as first
class professionals when attending a meeting with
engineers and scientists." Beliefs and values, even of
this magnitude, can and should be changed through
training and communication.
Subcultures are small or large groups of people which
represent "for or against" organizations. One subcul-
ture at MSFC overtook the dominant culture in 1983
when the Data General computer system was imple-
mented. The subculture for modernization included a
strong leader and a secretarial work force that was tired
of the status quo. Many resisted vigorously but the
silent majority of the workforce wanted computers,
word processing, and electronic mail. The silent
majority won.
It should be noted that most places, whether private
industry or government, where TQM is being applied
has a culture that probably rejects it. Although TQM is
not difficult to apply, it will probably fail for many who
attempt it due to the management and worker mindset
"We don't do things that way here". The challenge is
for the TQM subculture, much like the one developing
in the ASRM Project, to emerge dominant. The other
challenge is for ASRM to be treated as a Total Quality
Company and not as a government project.
Education and Training
Training at MSFC is primarily tuned to skill retention
for daily operations. TQM and the task of advancing
technology are accommodated differently. Seminars
such as those offered by the Deming Institute are
attended off-site by selected employees. Focus semi-
nars (Taguchi Methods, etc.) are offered on-site by
organizations such as the American Supplier Institute
(ASI). Universities supplement the TQM curriculum
through courses in Engineering Management offered
by Tennessee, Auburn, and Alabama which closely
correlate to TQM's founding principles.
According to Philip B. Crosby, the overall educational
aspect of Quality Management requires an executive,
management, and employee education system so
everyone can comprehend their roles. The purpose of
executive education is to help senior people understand
their role in causing problems and then causing
improvement in the quality process. Because they are
theoverallmanagersofthecompany,everythingthey
dois important and watched. In management educa-
tion all the content from the executive education should
be covered with the addition of several items in great
detail to enable them to make the necessary communi-
cation to the employees. The other 95 percent of the
people in the company should get videos, workshops,
and materials that can be taken back to the workplace
and applied as it relates to real life. 22
MSFC has initiated training in TQM on-site beginning
with selected managers. This is a prelude to a center-
wide program. Managers will receive two days of
instruction while the work force will eventually
receive a two-hour awareness session. The training
budget for this effort totals $400,000 during 1991, with
university curriculum and special courses in addition
to that. The on-site sessions will be conducted by ASI,
a firm who has offered TQM courses previously at
MSFC in design parameter and process control. The
current ASI course material is general, incorporating
teamwork and other aspects of TQM. The balancing
effect of the behavioral sciences, including Herzberg's
Theory of Job Satisfaction, Maslow's Hierarchy of
Human Needs, and McGregor's Theory X and Theory
Y, are offered in some MSFC middle and upper man-
agement courses (Appendix N). Without the balance of
motivated people, the tools and methods offered by
Taguchi cannot be effective.
Education is essential to TQM. It will become obvious
in a short time that employee empowerment is the force
that frees the "entrepreneurs". According to Rosabeth
Moss Kanter, "corporate entrepreneurs" are often the
authors not of the grand gesture but of the quiet
innovation. They are the ones who translate the strat-
egy-set at the top--into actual practice, and by doing
so, shape what the strategy turns out to mean.23 The TQM
training at MSFC should be structured for the emergence
of the entrepreneur.
The $400,000 TQM training budget for 1991, MSFC
sponsorship of Engineering Management curriculums,
and special short courses, seminars, and colloquiums
certainly indicate a "top management commitment" to
TQM education. Analysis of the existing culture, how-
ever indicates that a number of barriers to change exist
and that the culture change necessary for TQM will be
difficult. There is risk in training an entire work force
in the principles of TQM. From that point on, they
know management's role. If management is not will-
ing to play out the new role, the workforce will know
the difference and the newest fad will no longer be in
vogue.
The Xerox Corporation and other American compa-
nies faced with extinction adopted "Cascade Training"
as the ultimate demonstration of management com-
mitment.24"You don't learn it until you teach it" became
the motto at Xerox. Executive management was trained
and, in turn, trained the next level of management.
Training cascaded through the levels of management
in this manner until the message reached the workforce.
Lack of sincerity was as easily detected as strong
commitment. "Cascade Training" would be the ulti-
mate test and its success would convince the project's
work force and supporters that ASRM managers know
what they are talking about and believe what they say.
ASRM Influence on
Other Organizations
The ASRM Project is committed to a different begin-
ning. Other projects and organizations talk about TQM
and some use a few Taguchi methods. ASRM has the
opportunity to serve as the example--to be the "lonely
little petunia in the onion patch".
The brightly colored petunia will have an increasing
impact on existing projects, especially its peers in the
immediate Shuttle organization. The previous
frontrunner projects will have a new competitor who
sponsors a comprehensive program of continuous
improvement. A high regard for people could set up a
migration of talent from projects who manage by
Theory X control rather than through leadership. It will
prove that Theory X and hygienes do not work very
well in an educated, success-oriented workforce and
that Theory Y and satisfiers are more effective. In
short, it will change the management style in the
neighboring organizations because the workforce will
require it.
Future projects should not be managed like the existing
ones. New tools and philosophies should prevail and
the example set by ASRM should be a guiding light.
The ASRM model will change the complexion of
manufacturing for future projects, giving rise to SPC
and real-time process control charts posted at every
work station. The ASRM may serve as a workforce
seedbed, training employees for future projects in the
ways of TQM. Transferring these employees as the
Statement of Work is being developed for a new
project would guarantee a change in the structuring of
future Requests for Proposal. New ways to measure
contractor performance could result in being oriented
toward product uniformity and cross-functional team
effectiveness.
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Finally,supportorganizationsthatview theASRM
Projectasa customerwill adoptanewrelationship
builtontherealizationthat"nobodyisacustomerall
thetime". Visibility of a positiverelationshipwith
ASRMwill affectall supportgroupswhowouldcer-
tainly wantto be treatedthesameway.The story
continueswiththerealizationamongsupportgroups
that,if knowinghow to bea customerandthena
supporterworkswith ASRM,it cancertainlywork
between support organizations.
Having the strength of character to be a petunia is hard,
but the success from it has been proven over and over.
A positive model is contagious, especially when others
are tired of being an onion and find that they also can
be a petunia. •
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 ecommendations
In accordance with an Effect-Cause-Effect analysis, 20
percent of the potential remedies will have 80 percent
of the success. This 20 percent is called the core.
Problems in the core have underlying causes and a
wide impact. Remedies applied to the core change the
system versus finding a change within the system.
These remedies change persistent habits.
The analysis previously presented was based on a
literature search, interviews, surveys, studies, and
material received from Engineering Management
courses and topic related seminars. The analysis has
resulted in a number of recommendations regarding
the implementation of TQM. These recommendations
are summarized below with expanding comments fol-
lowing. They are classified as specific recommendations
for the ASRM Project and systematic changes for
MSFC.
Specific ASRM Recommendations
1. Develop a clearly stated direction for TQM
Implementation in the ASRM Project based
on accepted definitions.
2. Assure visible commitment of management
to TQM.
3. Demonstrate employee trust by empowering
a highly competent work force to make deci-
sions and do the work.
4. Initiate "Cascade Training."
5. Prioritize training for ASRM project and
support personnel and use as Total Quality
Company pilot project.
6. Specially train and develop S&MA represen-
tatives in the ASRM Project as SPC "coaches";
eliminate the "inspector" image.
7. Pilot core cultural improvements with cross-
functional teams.
8. Reorganize ASRM Chief Engineer's Office to
support cross-functianal, product-oriented
teams as a TQM pilot.
TQM Recommendations
mASRM Project
l. Develop a clear vision statement that tells employ-
ees where ASRM project management expects to
lead them in TQM during the next two years and set
goals for the next ten years using accepted defini-
tions. Provide the "how-to" guidelines, associating
the processes closely to the training being offered.
Avoid interpreting TQM to fit easily and routinely
into the management style of the dominant culture.
Develop the management style to fit TQM.
2. Make a visible commitment to TQM, top to bottom
organizationally, ensuring that every employee is
convinced of the commitment. Conduct monthly
TQM seminars, colloquiums, and include as a
topic in telecons and reviews.
3. Empower employees by pushing decision-making
to the lowest levels possible. Eliminate centralized
decision-making, hoarding of information, and
communication filters. As employees are accus-
tomed to the dominant culture, they must be
informed of the empowerment. Teams cannot be
effective without the power to effect an outcome.
4. Initiate a"Cascade Training" policy for managers.
Cascade training assures "TQM knowledgeable"
management, reinforces commitment, and
strengthens the future cultural norm.
5. Prioritize TQM training for ASRM managers and
internal support group managers and use ASRM as
the test case for treating a government project like
a Total Quality Company. The ASRM Project
should be a success model to serve as a "petunia in
the onion patch".
6. Develop the ASRM Project S&MA representa-
tives as SPC coaches. Eliminate the image of
"procedure police" and "inspectors". Enable
S&MA to become an organization that provides
leadership in real-time process control, properly
applied and visibly displayed control charts, and
minimizing inspection. Enable S&MA to lead the
culture shift from "meeting spec" to "uniformity
around the target value". Enable S&MA to pilot
the change from management reports that measure
27
.defects based on unrelated data to a reporting
system that feeds meaningful information up from
the workstation or activity.
Develop the ASRM culture to intentionally ad-
dress TQM principles, tools, and philosophies.
Challenge the bureaucracy on counterproductive
norms and depart from them. Conduct cross-func-
tional teams to pilot:
(a) The one sheet performance appraisal The
format concept is to be determined. The goal is
to separate performance that can only be "met"
from that representing extraordinary achieve-
ment or effort. The narrative should be limited
to one-third page and all supervisors rained in
the new system's use.
(b) New communication paths between inter-
nal customers. Simply becoming a team and
meeting establishes informal links. Experi-
ment with team directed listings in electronic
mail. Evaluate the impacts of eliminating un-
necessary "chain of command" and test the
new employee empowerment with lower level
decision making.
(c) Scheduling and SPC techniques that track
variability and effectiveness of the govern-
ment activities, using applicable software.
°
First pilots could be technical evaluations,
pricing, legal opinions, personnel actions, and
other support elements that are measurable.
In analyzing the current ASRM organization
(fig. 9, page 13) for the forming of teams, represen-
tatives from the following organizations would be
a requirement for each team: Chief Engineer (2-4
people), Business Management (one person),
facilities (one person), procurement (one person),
S&MA (one person), and the S&E Laboratories
(between 5-25 people). Representatives from staff
offices (Comptroller, Chief Council) should be
added when appropriate (fig. 12). Their organiza-
tion should be an "All-Channel Network" with
open lines of communication between each element
and decentralized decision making. 25These teams
should be product oriented (like the PDT's) and
should be responsible for all MSFC activities re-
lated to that product. Recommended teams are:
Nozzle, Case, Ignition Systems/Motor Finishing,
Propellant/Loaded Segment, Insulated/Lined Seg-
ment, and Motor Test. It is also recommended that
a Computer/Information Systems team be formed
and facilitated by project office personnel instead
of Chief Engineer personnel. These teams should
be pro-active instead of reactive as the MSFC
Communication Study Team Report (Appendix
H) states.
Business
Management
Representative
Facilities
Representative
Procurement
Representative
Example ASRM Team
Chief Engineer
Representatives
Design and Development
and Productivity Engineering
Safety and
Mission Assurance
Reprasentative
_ _ _1 Engineering
/ \ \ II Laboratory
_ Repr_entati_s
I Staff Office
I Representatives
I (i.e., Comptroller,
I Chief Council)
I (When Appropriate}
Figure 12
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Theorganizationalrepresentativescouldreadilysup-
port teams(with propertraining)withoutformal
reorganizationwith theexceptionof theProductivity
EngineeringroupintheChiefEngineer'sOffice.The
ProductivityEngineeringroupwouldbemoreeffec-
tive if it wasproductorientedlike theDesignand
Developmentgroup.Theyshouldbereorganizedinthe
followingmanner:
.
.
Have the Chief Engineer's representative who is
resident at Iuka, Mississippi report to the Chief
Engineer instead of to the Productivity Engineer-
ing Manager (fig. 13). It is perceived that this
individual is the Productivity Engineering repre-
sentative- not the Chief Engineer' s.
Reassign the computer/software/information sys-
tems person as a direct report to the Project Manager
(fig. 14, page 30). This effort is the backbone of the
ASRM Project (automation) and requires project
resources and across the board visibility, not just
S&E.
. The remaining three positions (Production
Integration, Tooling/Production Automation, and
Manufacturing Processes) should be reorganized
into five (5) product categories: Case Manufacture
and Refurbishment, Insulated/Lined Segment,
Propellant (Loaded Segment), Finished Segments
and Igniter, and Nozzle. Each person would be
responsible for the functional areas (processing,
equipment, and tooling) of their product (fig. 13).
The reorganization of Productivity Engineering would
assist in the teaming effort for the ASRM Project.
Co-facilitators for the teams should be the representa-
tives from the Design and Development and
Productivity Engineering Groups. These teams should
be supported with scheduling and SPC tools which
provide visibility and accountability to product de-
velopment, resources, MSFC support, and contractor
interaction. Teaming would also allow the S&E
Laboratories more visibility, participation into deci-
sions, and alleviate some of the workload from the
Chief Engineer's Office.
I Resident H
Chief
Engineer
!
I Systems Engineering Iand Integration
Systems Engineering I
Systems Integration
,_ Logistics/Ground
Support Equipment/
Transportation Support
E_uipment
'_1 Operations
,_ Systems AssuranceIntegration
Proposed
ASRM Chief Engineer
Designand Development
Engineering I
Technical
Assistant
23 Positions
I
1
Productivity
Engineering
,_ Nozzle Subsystem
'_ Case Subsystem
,_ Ignition System/
Insulation/Motor
Finishing
,_ Propellant/Liner/Ballistics
'_1 Test/Instrumentation
Nozzle Subsystem
Case Subsystem
and Refurbishment
Ignition System/
Motor Finishing
Propellant/
Loaded Segment
Insulated/
Lined Segment
Figure 13
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TQM Systematic
Recom mendatio ns-- MSFC
Specific MSFC Recommendations
1. Provide comprehensive TQM training,
2. Select new managers andpartiallyexecutives
based on their TQM track record,
3. Following center-wide training, benchmark
the entire work force for TQM status.
During the course of implementing management
programs such as TQM, the development of a support-
ive culture is usually neglected. This is a fatal mistake
and usually serves as the genesis of another disap-
pointing fad instead of a meaningful change. The
following are the TQM recommendations expanded to
serve as guidelines for core cultural change.
. Broaden the TQM training curriculum to include
behavioral sciences, ensuring that TQM training is
comprehensive as figures 3 and 4 (pages 8 and 9)
suggest. As the current curriculum appears tai-
lored to the technical community, consider alternate
tailoring for non-technical professionals. Comple-
,
.
tion of the TQM curriculum should be required
before new managers assume supervisory respon-
sibilities. Encourage managers to enroll in
video-based graduate courses in Engineering
Management.
The MSFC executive selection criteria currently
contains a TQM category. Modify the criteria for
executive management candidacy to include
demonstration that the applicant actively contrib-
utes to a supportive cultural environment for TQM.
Broaden the TQM category emphasis to include
managers and select new managers based on
knowledge and practice of TQM principles.
Reassess implementation status after the TQM
training series and familiarization sessions.
Survey entire work force using the original bench-
mark assessment format to determine if
commitment is being communicated. All areas
appear to be in the 2-2.5 range on a scale of 1-5
(Appendix G), which implies "average" in all
areas. Reassessment after training may pinpoint
areas that need more attention. A lower TQM
implementation assessment rating may result as
awareness becomes higher. This action will send a
message to the work force that their opinion counts.
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Project
(Proposed)
ProjectManager
S&MA
Yellow Creek
Resident Office
i
Business IManagement ChiefEngineer
1
Computers/Software/ IInformation ystems
I
Systems Engineering i& Integration
Yellow Creek
Resident Office
I1
Design & Development II
Engineering I
I
Productivity IEngineering
Figure 14
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mplementation Plan
Based on the recommendations, the following specific
actions are offered for the ASRM Project:
1. Immediately enroll all ASRM managers in com-
prehensive TQM training.
2. At course completion, initiate "Cascade Train-
ing" for the benefit of ASRM Project personnel,
3. In conjunction with the "Cascade Training,"
involve all ASRM employees in developing a
vision statement and guiding principles.
4. Reassign Resident Chief Engineer and Com-
puter/Information Systems person to
recommended areas.
5. Begin forming teams as recommended, adding
Productivity Engineering personnel as neces-
sary and obtaining endorsement from supporting
organizations.
.
.
,
.
10.
Require teams to complete the team develop-
ment training course that emphasizes group
decision-making techniques.
Participatively establish goals, objectives and
milestones for the pilot projects and prioritize
sequence of activities.
Initiate team meetings with existing three Pro-
ductivity Engineering personnel transitioning
functional duties to team co-facilitators.
Continue forming teams with existing Produc-
tivity Engineering personnel until all teams are
formed.
Establish decision criteria for transitioning pilot
activity to full-scale implementation. •
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ummary
TQM challenges norms. The newly formed ASRM
Project has inherited a full set of norms from a long-
standing and well-ingrained culture. ASRM, as any
government program, lives by codes, regulations, and
standards established by agencies outside NASA con-
trol. The ASRM Project is not like a new business
started in a garage by an entrepreneur with a few good
ideas. It is more like a newborn baby being assessed by
grandparents. The child is determined to have eyes like
the mother and feet like the father and other physical
features like someone in the family. The child seems to
have nothing of its own, much like the new ASRM
Project.
TQM has great potential to improve almost all aspects
of the MSFC culture thus impacting the ASRM
operations. Although the bottom line impact on the
ASRM cannot be accurately predicted, industries such
as Xerox, IBM, GE and others herald the necessity of
TQM.
The ASRM Project personnel previously worked in
other areas and have seen management fads come and
go. They currently have a very limited knowledge of
TQM principles, but based on experience, they are
skeptical as to its survival. Senior management prom-
ises commitment--just like the fads before TQM. The
work force awaits the true indicators--culture change,
improved systems, and people-oriented leadership.
Within a year TQM will reach that point in program
maturity where other management philosophies lost
commitment and became fads. There are, however,
several encouraging factors. Surveys and benchmarks
are being used for self-evaluation, a critical component
in the continuous improvement process. The entire
work force at MSFC will receive some form of TQM
training this year, demonstrating that management is
willing to risk having a "TQM Literate" workforce
watching their every move.
The ASRM Project has a unique opportunity to imple-
ment a TQM strategy more quickly and thoroughly
than MSFC. The project has people with the right
attitudes, personalities and management styles to natu-
rally follow TQM principles. ASRM's success will
have an impact on existing and future projects, making
them "walk what they talk" on SPC, Theory Y
management, and focusing on customer needs. ASRM' s
"petunia in the onion patch" could become less lonely
over the next few years.
It is possible to effect a culture change at MSFC to
implement TQM. The question remains as to the prob-
ability. Retirement attrition changes senior management
every few years, changing priorities and commitment.
If TQM is undertaken as an endeavor by the current
senior management without commitment from the
next four generations, TQM will fail. If on the other
hand, TQM principles can become accepted for the
next generations of management, it will survive the
near term resistance to change and become the new
norm. •
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A Walk Around the Space Shuttle
The Space Shuttle's superlative design provides capa-
bilities and a flexibility unmatched by any other launch
system. Here is what makes it work.
The Shuttle's major components are: the orbiter
spacecraft; the three main engines, with a combined
thrust of almost 1.2 million pounds; the huge external
tank (ET) that feeds the liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid
oxygen oxidizer to the three main engines; and the two
solid rocket boosters (SRB's), with their combined
thrust of some 5.8 million pounds, which provide most
of the power for the first two minutes of flight.
The SRB's take the Space Shuttle to an altitude of 28
miles and a speed of 3,094 miles per hour before they
separate and fall back into the ocean to be retrieved,
refurbished, and prepared for another flight.
After the solid rocket boosters are jettisoned, the
orbiter's three main engines, fed by the external tank,
continue to provide thrust for another six minutes
before they are shut down, at which time the giant tank
is jettisoned and falls back to Earth, disintegrating in
the atmosphere.
The Space Shuttle Orbiter
The orbiter is both the brains and heart of the Space
Transportation System.
About the same size and weight as a DC-9 aircraft, the
orbiter contains the pressurized crew compartment
(which can normally carry up to seven crew members),
the huge cargo bay, and the three main engines mounted
on its aft end.
The thermal tile system, which protects the orbiter
during its searing reentry through the atmosphere, was
a breakthrough technology that proved much more
challenging than expected.
There are three levels to the crew cabin. Uppermost is
the flight deck where the commander and the pilot
control the mission, surrounded by an array of switches
and controls. During the launch of a seven-member
crew, two other astronauts are positioned on the flight
deck behind the commander and pilot. The three other
crew members are in launch positions in the mid-deck,
which is below the flight deck.
The mid-deck is where the galley, toilet, sleep stations,
and storage and experiment lockers are found for the
PRE'CED_NG
basic needs of weightless, daily living. Also located in
the mid-deck are the side hatch for passage to and from
the vehicle before and after landing, and the airlock
hatch into the cargo bay and space beyond. It is through
this hatch and airlock that astronauts go to don their
spacesuits and manned maneuvering units (MMU's)
and prepare for extravehicular activities (EVA' s), more
popularly known as "spacewalks." These excursions
have produced some of the most important space firsts
in the Shuttle program as well as the most spectacular
photographic vistas of the space age. Below the mid-
External
Main Engine
Solid Rocket
Booster
Orbiter
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deck's floor is a utility area for the air and water tanks
and their ducts.
The Space Shuttle's cargo bay is adaptable to hundreds
of tasks. Large enough to accommodate a tour bus,
(60 x 15 feet) the cargo bay instead carries satellites,
spacecraft, and Spacelab scientific laboratories to and
from Earth orbit. It is also a work station for astronauts
to repair satellites, a foundation from which to erect
space structures, and a hold for retrieved satellites to be
returned to Earth.
Mounted on the port side of the cargo bay behind the
crew quarters is the remote manipulator system (RMS).
The RMS is a robot arm and hand with three joints
analogous to those of the human shoulder, elbow, and
wrist. It is operated from the aft station of the orbiter's
flight deck. The RMS, some 50 feet long, can move
anything from satellites to astronauts to and from the
cargo bay or to different points in nearby space.
Thermal tile insulation and blankets (also known as the
thermal protection system or TPS) cover the underbelly,
bottom of the wings, and other heat-bearing surfaces of
the orbiter and protects it during its fiery reentry into
the Earth's atmosphere.
Designed to be used for 100 missions before replace-
ment is necessary, the Shuttle's 24,000 individual tiles
are made primarily of pure-sand silicate fibers, mixed
with a ceramic binder. Incredibly lightweight, about
the density of balsa wood, they dissipate the heat so
quickly that a white-hot tile with a temperature of 2,300
degrees Fahrenheit can be taken from an oven and held
in bare hands without injury.
The Main Engines and
Orbital Propulsion Systems
The three main engines are clustered at the aft end of
the orbiter and have combined thrust of almost 1.2
million pounds at sea level. They are high perfor-
mance, liquid propellant rocket engines whose thrust
can be varied over a range of 65 to 109 percent of their
rated power level. They are the world's first reusable
rocket engines, designed to operate for 55 flights, and
are 14 feet long and 8 feet in diameter at the nozzle exit.
Two orbital maneuvering system (OMS) engines,
mounted on either side of the upper aft fuselage,
provide thrust for major orbital changes. For more
exacting motions in orbit, forty-four small rocket
engines, clustered on the Shuttle's nose and on either
side of the tail, are used. Together they are known as the
Flight Deck_
Mid_
reaction control system and are used to aid in retriev
ing, launching, and repairing satellites in orbit.
The External Tank
The giant cylinder, higher than a 15-story building,
with a length of 154 feet, and as wide as a silo with a
diameter of 27.5 feet, is the largest single piece of the
Space Shuttle. During launch, the external tank also
acts as a backbone for the orbiter and solid rocket
boosters to which it is attached.
In separate pressurized tank sections inside, the exter-
nal tank holds the liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid
oxygen oxidizer for the Shuttle's three main engines.
During launch, the external tank feeds the fuel under
pressure through 17-inch ducts which branch off into
smaller lines that feed directly into the main engines.
Some 64,000 gallons of fuel are consumed by the main
engines each minute.
Machined from aluminum alloys, the Space Shuttle's
external tank is the only part of the launch vehicle that
currently is not reused. After its 526,000 gallons of
propellants are consumed during the first eight and
one-half minutes of flight, it is jettisoned from the
orbiter and breaks up in the upper atmosphere, its
pieces falling into remote ocean waters.
The Solid Rocket Boosters
The Space Shuttle's two solid rocket boosters, the first
designed for refurbishment and reuse, are also the
largest solids ever built and the first to be flown on a
manned spacecraft. Together they provide the majority
of the thrust for the first two minutes of flight--some
5.8 million pounds.
40
Thesolidpropellantmix iscomposedof 16percent
aluminumpowder(fuel)andalmost70percentammo-
niumperchlorate(oxidizer),withtheremaindermade
upof abinder,acuringagent,andasmallamountof
catalyst.A smallrocketmotorineachboosterignites
thepropellantatlaunch.Duringflight,thesolidbooster
nozzleswiveluptosixdegrees,redirectingthethrust
andsteeringtheSpaceShuttletowardorbit. •
ASRM Design
Insulation
• Uses Improved RSRM J-Seal Design at Field Joint
• New Castable Inhibitor-to-Stress Relief
Flap Joint Location Minimizes Potential
for Jetting Into Sidewall Insulation
• Asbestos-Free Formulation
Nozzle
• Reduces Number of Flame and
Nonflame Insulator Joints
• Eliminates 72 Stat-O-Seals
and Associated Leak Paths
Case
• Eliminates One Field Joint
• Superior Fracture Toughness
• Higher Stress Corrosion Resistance
• Welded Factory Joints
• Integral Stiffeners and ET Attach Ring
in Aft Segment Eliminates Failure Points
Experienced With Bolt-On Stiffeners and Ring
Grain/Ignition
• Safety Margin in Forward Fin
Trailing Edge Nearly Doubled
• Igniter Design Eliminates 32
Chamber Bolt Leak Paths
• Expendable Carbon Filament
Chamber
• TBI Initiator Eliminates S&A
Device Leak Paths
Propellant
• Industry-Proven HTPB Propellant with over 60M Ibs
Successfully Produced
• Formulated and Proven for Continuous Mix Process
• Density Impulse Increased 24 Percent Versus RSRM Propellant
• High Positive Margins Under All Required Conditions
Courtesyof LockheedGencorpAetojet Space Boosters
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
DRAFT
DATE CIRCULAR A-
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
SUBJECT: Improving the Quality of Government Products and
Services
I. Purpose. This circular provides guidance for developing and
maintaining high-performing executive agencies that continuously
improve the quality of their products and services and the
efficiency of the processes that produce them. The guidance
contained herein is a natural extension and refinement of the
government-wide effort, begun in 1986, to improve quality and
productivity in Federal agencies.
2. ADthQrity. Executive Order 12637 provides authority for the
establishment of quality and productivity improvement efforts in
executive departments and agencies. The Executive Order places
overall direction of this effort with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and authorizes the Director to set goals,
policies, standards, and guidelines for the administration of the
order.
3. Policy. Federal agencies are expected to make continuous,
incremental improvement in the quality, timeliness, efficiency,
and effectiveness of their products and services by implementing
Total Quality Management (TQM) practices. The TQM approach
incorporates all of the key features for achieving high
performance in organizations and achieving quality results, i.e.,
delivering products and services that are responsive to customer
requirements, achieve their intended purpose, and make effective
use of taxpayer dollars.
4. Scope and Applicability. This circular applies to the
executive agencies listed in Attachment A.
5. General Definitions. The following definitions are used in
relation to quality and productivity improvement:
Total Ouality_ Management (TQM): a total, integrated
organizational approach for meeting customer needs and
expectations that involves all managers and employees and uses
quantitative methods and employee involvement to improve
continuously the organization's processes, products and services.
C_$%Qmer: the persons or groups wi%hin the organization for
whom intermediate products or services are provided (internal
customers); the persons or groups outside the organization for
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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whom final products or services are provided (external
customers) .
_/P_: the persons or groups within the organization who
provide input (e.g., information, material) to internal customers
(internal suppliers); the persons or groups outside the
organization who provide input (e.g., information, material)
necessary to produce goods or deliver services (external
suppliers).
Ouali%y: the extent to which products or services meet
customer requirements and expectations.
Productivity: the efficiency with which resources are used
to produce a product or provide a service.
_: the promptness with which products and services
are delivered, relative to customer requirements and
expectations.
Effectiveness: the extent to which a product or service
delivered to a customer achieves its intended purpose.
Pr__r_Qg_e_S_: the transformation of input through a series of
activities that use people, materials, methods (including
machines) to produce a product or provide a service for a
customer.
Agency: the five independent agencies listed in Attachment
A and the major cQmponents of the 14 Cabinet Departments.
6. Total Ouality Management. TQM is a comprehensive management
approach for achieving high performance and improving quality by
examining in a systematic manner, throughout the whole
organization, methods by which work gets done. The focus is on
increasing value to the customer by ensuring that all work
processes efficiently and effectively provide the service that
customers want.
Organizations in both the private and public sectors that
have adopted the TQM approach consistently increase value to
customers, improve productivity, reduce total costs, improve
products and services, achieve better planning and forecasting,
reduce administrative overhead, reduce rework and waste, and
improve employee performance and morale. Businesses in the
private sector that have won the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award have employed TQM practices. The application of
TQM can help to resolve some of the problems which pose major
challenges for Federal agencies -- public image, cost efficient
products, competitiveness, and bureaucratic impacts on customers.
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Two conditions are essential for the success of TQM in any
organization: leadership commitment and education and training.
TQM cannot be instituted by groups external to line management.
Although quality offices exist, they best function as advisors.
Top managers must be committed to quality improvement and
motivate their mid-level managers and employee to achieve
improvement in the organization. Education and training in
quality techniques and problem-solving skills are needed to
analyze processes and design improvements. Without top
management leadership and an extensive training effort, other TQM
practices will not take root.
Quality improvement under TQM also emphasizes: a) the
avoidance of rework due to errors, unclear procedures or other
causes; b) continuous examination of procedures and processes to
improve the quality of outputs and the efficiency of work; c) the
elimination of work that adds no overall value; and d) continuous
reduction in the cycle time required for providing services. TQM
is a dramatic departure from traditional "quality control"
programs which focused only on accepting or rejecting final
outputs at the end of the process. Resources saved by "doing
the right thing right the first time" results in improved
efficiency and better service to the public. Productivity is an
expected outcome of quality and a necessary companion to
improving service.
TQM requires a long-term commitment to ensure that the
desire for excellence is deeply embedded in the organization and
that improvements in service will be continuous. Experience
indicates that changing the culture of an organization requires
time and determination on the part of top management. The work
environment must place a premium on quality, build structures
that will sustain change and provide education to support the
effort. Some results will be immediate and many will be
incremental, but others may take several years to achieve.
TQM involves top executives, managers, union leadership, and
employees together in creating a culture of excellence that
emphasizes:
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Top management leadership and support
Strategic planning and implementation geared to long-
term success
Focus on the customer
Commitment to training and recognition
Employee empowerment and teamwork
Reliance on measurement and analysis of processes and
outputs
Quality assurance
A more complete description of TQM is contained in Attachment B.
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7. Agency Responsibilities. Agency heads are responsible for
achieving the objective of this governmentwide effort: to make
continuous, incremental improvement in the quality, timeliness,
efficiency, and effectiveness of products and services by
implementing TQM. TQM should be implemented throughout the
agency, since it is a total management system that applies to all
levels, all functions, all services, and all employees.
Agency heads and their top management teams should be
directly and actively involved in the implementation of TQM (see
Attachments B anc C). This responsibility is integral to line
operations, critical to the success of TQM, and cannot be
delegated. Top management must make a long-term commitment and
provide constancy of purpose toward long-range goals.
It should be noted that agencies are in different stages of
implementing TQM. Many have not yet begun, others are in the
planning stages, some have just begun to implement, and a few are
in their second, third or fourth year of implementation. Because
of these variances and diverse stages of readiness for change, as
well as dissimilar organizational cultures, external
environments, management styles and characteristics of programs
and services, agencies are not expected to implement TQM in
lockstep, and will not be compared to other agencies. Rather,
each agency is expected to proceed at its own pace, but should
demonstrate progress against its own past record. For agencies
just starting to implement TQM, some reasonable expectations for
the first year of implementation are described at Attachment E.
Agencies are strongly encouraged to share information on TQM
implementation (e.g., training materials) with other agencies,
especially small agencies (e.g., through the Small Agencies
Council) and to form information-sharing networks in similar
program activities.
A. Reporting Progress to the Administr_%iQn.
i) Report on the implementation of TQM. Each yearagen-
cies (see definition on page 2) should review their progress in imple-
menting TQM. The annual review of progress may be
conducted either formally or informally at an agency's
discretion. For example, a formal review might take the form of
an organizational self-assessment using a diagnostic survey
instrument (e.g., Department of Defense's Quality and
Productivity Self-Assessment Guide), an assessment of TQM by a
team of management analysts or by a team of managers from inside
and outside the agency. An informal review might consist of
reliance on regularly reported information to the agency's
Quality Council (or Policy Board) from all parts of the agency.
Whether the review is conducted formally or informally, the
agency should make every effort to ensure its accuracy by
soliciting the views of various groups (e.g., employees, unions,
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customers, suppliers) on relevant issues. If conducted
carefully, the review should become an instrument for planning
improvements.
Following the annual review of progress, agencies should use
Attachment C, "A Description of Various Phases of TQM
Implementation in an Organization" to determine which phase in
each of the seven basic TQM elements best describes their level
of implementation. These results should be reported to OMB b_
March 31 each year beginning in 1991_ using the format at
Attachment D, pages i, 2, and 3.
Because only six phases of implementation are described for
each TQM element in Attachment C, it is likely that an agency
will not move through a phase each year. Movement to a new phase
each year would mean advancing from non-involvement in TQM to a
world-class quality organization in six years, a highly unlikely
feat. The reporting format at Attachment D, therefore, provides
a page to list significant actions taken during the year. Thus,
progress in implementing TQM that may not be apparent from
examining the phases of implementation can be captured in this
narrative format.
2) Report on the_ quality,_imeliness, eff_c4A_aD__
effectiveness of key products/services. A report, using pages 4,
5, and 6 of Attachment D, should be sent to OMB by March 31 e_ch
year beginning in 1992. This time lag in reporting performance
data should give agencies sufficient time to develop performance
indicators. For agencies just beginning to implement TQM it is
more important to advance the TQM process and wait to tackle the
measurement issue at the appropriate implementation phase. This
will occur only after identifying customer requirements and
building those into the measurement system.
Those agencies which have already identified the customers
of their key products and services, know customer requirements,
translated those requirements into indicators of quality and
timeliness, and tracked their efficiency and effectiveness, may
wish to report all or some of this information in 1991. Many
agencies have already developed good quality, timeliness, and
efficiency measures as part of their past quality and
productivity improvement efforts and these measures could
continue to be used. For 1991, however, this report is
optional.
The products and services to be reported on will be worked
out between each agency and OMB during 1990. Program functions
previously included in each agency's quality and productivity
program inventory will serve as a starting point of discussion.
Primary consideration will be given to products and services that
consume a significant part of an agency's resources and/or
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provide an important service to the agency's customers or the
general public.
Any agency which applies for the Quality Improvement
Prototype Award or the President's Award for Quality need not
submit an annual report for the year in which an award
application is submitted, since the information will be
duplicative.
B. Coordination of TOM Implementation. The head of each
agency listed in Attachment A is responsible for ensuring that
all components are implementing TQM and should appoint a personal
representative of sufficient stature to coordinate this effort.
This senior official will also serve as the key contact point
between the agency and OMB. OMB's Assistant Director of General
Management will meet with the TQM coordinators on a quarterly
basis to exchange information, discuss policy, progress, and any
problems that occur.
C. FQrmation of Executive TOM Networks. During 1990, OMB
will work with the TQM Coordinators to establish several
Executive TQM Networks of senior-level line managers from the
major bureaus, services, commands. Each network will consist of
key line managers (not staff) performing similar functions; e.g.,
health care, social services, research, investigations. A list
of functional categories is at Attachment F.
The primary purpose of each Executive TQM Network is
information exchange. Bringing together several senior-level
managers involved in similar operations but at different levels
of TQM implementation is a technical assistance device of minimal
cost and high potential benefit. The network can provide an
opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss lessons learned from
those farther advanced in TQM. As a forum of functional experts
with credibility in the eyes of their peers, it can foster an
ongoing dialogue about TQM and facilitate its implementation.
8. _Qle of OMB. OMB is responsible for: a) providing policy
guidance and coordination for the government-wide effort; b)
working with agencies, the PCMI, and other outside groups to
provide the types of assistance described in Attachment G; c)
creating an atmosphere of positive reinforcement for TQM
implementation; and d) monitoring agency progress in achieving
the goals of TQM.
OMB will expand its assistance into two new areas beginning
in 1990. The first is arranging for and coordinating on-site
quality reviews. These reviews, which will assess the status of
TQM implementation in agencies, will be conducted by small teams
of public and private sector managers who are implementing TQM in
their own organizations. The reviews will be conducted only at
5O
the request of an agency. OMB will tap various quality and
productivity associations, its 18 member TQM Advisory Group and
other private and public sector contacts to arrange for an
appropriate team to conduct the quality review. Costs for travel
will be shared by the requesting agency and the team of review
participants. C_Bwill work out all details of the quality
review with the requesting agency, including the level of OMB's
participation. The advantages of a quality review are several.
It can provide a benchmark of agency progress, clarify goals the
agency can strive for in the future, identify new ideas for
action based on the collective experience of the review team, and
provide an opportunity for managers to discuss candidly their
strengths and areas for improvement with an outside, objective
group.
The second area of assistance will consist of initiating
with the President's Council on Management Improvement (PCMI)
several pilot projects for de-regulating agencies to improve
service delivery. The projects are intended to create an
environment where managers close to the point of service delivery
have greater decision-making authority and more control over
their resources. The experi_nents will relax regulations in the
areas of budgeting, procurement, personnel and administrative
policies, thus creating greater flexibility. At the same time
accountability will be maintained through results-oriented
performance measures in the areas of quality, schedule, cost,
effectiveness, and integrity. The experiments, if successful,
will be expanded to larger segments of government and facilitate
the implementation of TQM.
9. Role of the PCMI. The PCMI, representing the participating
agencies, plays a leadership role in the implementation of the
government-wide effort to improve quality and productivity. The
PCMI, through its various committees, works with OMB in carrying
out the projects described above and in Attachment G. In
addition, it undertakes other projects to support and reinforce
TQM, such as publicizing exemplary practices and assisting
agencies to mount similar activities. The PCMI also provides
recommendations to OMB and the agencies for improving and
strengthening government-wide quality and productivity in service
delivery.
!0. Role of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM is
responsible for: a) reviewing and recommending appropriate
revisions of personnel policy and practices currently in effect
to support and facilitate agency implementation of TQM (e.g.,
areas of possible change might include classification, incentive
practices, delegations of authority, performance appraisal);
b) developing and issuing materials on selected topics, such as
incentives and position management, to assist agencies in
carrying out flexible personnel practices; c) developing and
implementing education and training programs for Federal
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employees on TQM.
ii. Federal Ouality Institute (FOI). Established in 1988 as
part of the government-wide effort to improve quality and
productivity, the FQI has three major purposes:
I) Provide quality awareness seminars and follow-up
assistance to top policy officials and senior executives to
encourage management understanding of and commitment to TQM;
2) Assist agencies to implement TQM by providing them with
a roster of qualified private sector consultants through a
Federal Supply Schedule contract; and
3) Provide information to agencies on improving quality
and productivity by operating a resource center that serves as a
TQM clearinghouse and referral service.
The FQI is a primary vehicle of information, training, and
consulting services available to agencies on the subject of Total
Quality Management. Agencies are encouraged to use its expertise
and resources. FQI can be reached by calling (202) 376-3751.
12. Effective Date: This circular is effective upon publication
and rescinds Circular A-132, dated April 22, 1988.
13. Sunset Date: This circular shall have an independent policy
review to ascertain its effectiveness three years after its
issuance.
14. Inquiries: Any questions regarding this circular should be
directed to the Quality Management Branch at (202) 395-3692.
Attachments
Richard Darman
Director
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EXECUTIVE AGENCIES INCLUDED IN THIS CIRCULAR
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs
ATTACHMENT A
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Personnel Management
United States Information Agency
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Management
Instruction
NMI 1270.2
Effective Date February 1, 1990
Expiration Date February__!_ 1990
Responsible Office:
Subject:
Q/Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Assurance (SRM& QA)
AGENCYWIDE TOTAL OUALITYMANAGEMENT
This Instruction establishes the NASA policy and
responsibilities for agencywide Total Quality Management
(TQM).
2. APPLICABILITY
This Instruction applies to field installations and NASA
Headquarters.
3.
First and foremost it must be stressed that the primary
purpose and objective of TQM is the achievement of mission
success in every activity that NASA does, whether it is
programmatic, research, administration, services or support.
Since 1982 NASA has had an active Quality and Productivity
Improvement (Q/PI) program. This ongoing NASA adaptation of
TQM fosters improved quality and productivity among both the
civil servant and the contractor work forces. It has been
particularly proactive in the external arena with programs
like the NASA Excellence Award for Quality and Productivity
and the annual contractors conferences and symposia. In the
ensuing years, Executive orders have mandated that Federal
agencies demonstrate a measurable increase in the quality of
goods and services and the productivity of the Federal work
force. To attain the latter end, NASA will pursue vigorous
proactive internal initiatives to conform to the spirit and
requirements of the Executive orders and Office of
Management and Budget directives and bulletins.
4. P_O/J2_
a.
Each installation and the Headquarters will develop and
actively pursue an approach to TQM based on elements
from two productivity publications, the "Strategies for
Revitalizing Organizations," dated August 1987 and
"NASA/Contractor Team - Summary of Strategies for
Planning Productivity Improvement and Quality
Enhancement (PIQE)" dated April 1986. Ten basic
tenets will be stressed:
Pk, F'CEDE_ PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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(i) Top management to provide leadership, personal
involvement, and long-term commitment.
(2) Set team goals and promote world class levels of
quality and performance.
(3) Support new technology and modernization in the
organization.
(4) Create an innovative and challenging team climate.
(5) Use participative management techniques to
increase individual/team contributions.
(6) Develop effective communications among employees,
contractors, and customers.
(7) Stimulate and promote individual involvement.
(8) Commitment to education and training.
(9) Develop and implement means to evaluate and
measure team performance.
(i0) Focus on the customer.
Each installation and the Headquarters' management is
responsible and accountable for developing and
implementing those actions required to meet the intent
and goals of the two cited documents referenced in
paragraph 4a. Each installation and the Headquarters
will have a minimum of two long-term goals with
measurable results, that respond to the President's
initiative, and a like number of short-term goals each
year that focus on the customer. To enhance teamwork
and esprit de corps, each installation's and the
Headquarters' yearly performance will be assessed and a
NASA Administrator's Excellence Award for Quality and
Productivity will be awarded for the best performance.
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° RESPONSIBILITIES
The implementation of TQM is the responsibility of all NASA
employees. Specifically:
(a) The Administrator, Associate Administrators, other
Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Offices, and the
Field Installation Directors are responsible for
providing executive leadership and overall direction to
integrate a TQMphilosophy. This group will also
function as the TQM Steering Committee.
_) Managers and supervisors are responsible for developing
a positive climate for TQM and are accountable for
communicating clear goals, focusing on mission success,
and encouraging employee participation.
(c) Each installation and the Headquarters, as an operating
entity, will provide a yearly plan that meets the
intent of publications referenced in paragraph 4 and
associated Executive orders.
(d) Each installation and the Headquarters, as an operating
entity, will identity "TQM" focal point. These
individuals will function as the TQM working team to
provide coordination of related activities and interchange
of ideas.
(e) Employees are responsible for carrying out the work and
making suggestions for work improvements to enhance the
quality of work and work life and, in turn, their own
performance.
(_ The responsibility for overall administration and
reporting for the agency program will be the Office of
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance (SRM&QA), Code Q.
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6. REPORTING
The responsible officials will ensure reports are rendered and
feedback provided to keep the Administrator fully and currently
informed of significant actions and other matters of substance
related to the provisions hereunder.
DISTRIBUTION:
SDL 1
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MANAGEMENT
ANNOUNCEMENT
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Space Flight Center Alabama 35812
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Originating Organization:
DX01
Effective Date:
MAY18 1990
Expiration Date:
Effective until rescinded
MA 1150. IA
Control No.:
Subject: MSFC Continuous Process Improvement Steering Council (CPI)
i. MEMBERSHIP
The following individuals are hereby appointed to the MSFC Continuous
Process Improvement Steering Council.
Chairperson
T. J. Lee, DA01
Alternate Chairpergon
J. W. Littles, DD01
Members
J. A. Bethay, DE01
G. F. McDonough, EA01
R. G. Sheppard, AA01
H. W. Hallisey, BC01
C. D. Bean, CO01
S. P. Saucier, FA01
J. W. Littles, HA01
H. G. Craft, Jr., JA01
G. D. Hopson, KA01
C. R. Darwin, PA01
G. P. Bridwell, SA01
F. S. Wojtalik, TA01
2. REFERENCE
NMI 1270.2, "Agency-Wide Total Quality Management," dated February i,
1990.
594 II50.1A, Charter 3-30, "MSFC Continuous Process Improvement
Steering Council," dated
Original signed
by
T.J. LEE
T.J. Lee
Director
Distribution:
SDL 1
All persons listed
MSFC-Form 2913 (Rev. July 1979)
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CHARTER
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
MSFC CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
STEERING COUNCIL (CPI)
MM
1150. IA
Charter Number:
3-30
Effective Date: MA¥181990
1. PURPOSE
To provide guidance, motivation, and oversight to the Center's
implementation of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI); to develop and
maintain the long-range process improvement plan establishing
appropriate goals for the Center; and to ensure a practical and
effective CPI effort for the Center.
2. SCOPE
The CPI Steering Council will ensure CPI methods are implemented and
monitored within Center organizations, component installations, and
contracted efforts as deemed appropriate.
3. D_FINITION
Continuous Process Improvement is a management philosophy/operating
methodology totally committed to:
a. Continuing improvement of all processes and products.
b. Satisfaction of internal and external customer needs.
c. Universal participation and teamwork.
4. POLICY
Pursuit of excellence through continuous improvement of products and
processes is a primary goal of the Marshall Space Flight Center. The
CPI Steering Council will be the guiding body for all efforts
embodying the CPI philosophy/methodology. Existing organizations will
prepare for and carry forward with CPI within their areas. Cross
functional teams will be utilized for study/improvement of processes
which cut across organizations and functions.
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Charter--MSFC Continuous Process Improvement Steering Council
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
.
o
2
a. Development of a long range plan for CPI efforts at MSFC and
establishment of goals.
b. Oversight and guidance to implementation of CPI.
c. Review of CPI efforts and results.
AUTHORITY/REFERENCE
NMI 1270.2, "Agency-Wide Total Quality Management," dated February i,
1990.
FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS
The CPI Steering Council will meet as required.
Original signed
by
T.J. LEE
T. J. lee
Director
Distribution:
SDL 1
All persons listed
MSFC - Form 3074 (Rev. July 1979)
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ASRM Project
Continuous Improvement Plan
By:
J.W. Thomas
Vice President, ASRM Project Manager
C.T. Levinsky
President, Aerojet ASRM Division
LOCKHEED • AEROJET RUST I
1.0 Introduction
This plan applies specifically to the operations of the
ASRM project. It is our plan to create and sustain an
environment that fosters continuous improvement. The
continuous improvement process is dedicated to the
principles of Total Quality Management (TQM). This
plan will outline the key elements in developing,
implementing, and following through with a TQM and
Continuous Improvement program.
Using systematic tools from the design and develop-
ment phase through characterization, verification,
control and process improvement phases; we have the
unique opportunity of establishing an effective Con-
tinuous Improvement Program from the project's
initiation.
2.0 Approach
The ASRM project's foundation is based on TQM and
Continuous Improvement. Our approach starts with
Facing Northwest, the ASRM Yellow Creek
Production Facility, Near luka, Mississippi
_E [_ :,_IfC'CtNTt01t/Ktf I_q PRL:_CEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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management commitment, beginning with the ASRM
Project Manager, and focuses on involvement of all
ASRM employees. This approach is expected to result
in improved quality, reliability, cost and schedule
performance. The purpose of continuous improvement
is to provide the customer with an improved product
and service.
The ASRM approach consists of the following:
• Top management commitment and leadership
• Product development teams
• Group participation in the design, development and
implementation processes
• Identification of customer and customer needs
3.0 Mission/Objective/Goals
3.1 Mission
The ASRM mission:
"Provide quality products, services, and system man-
agement to the ASRM project."
Quality refers to the competitive way we price our
product and services, the way we meet the customer's
needs in providing the product or service and the
timeliness with which we do it. Nothing short of
customer satisfaction will allow us to fulfill our
mission.
• Promotion of individual involvement
• Means to evaluate, measure, and report improvement
• Training and education of systematic tools
• Recognition of accomplishment
• Employee awareness
• Partnership with subcontractors.
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The Sun Sets on the 60-foot TVA Cooling Tower
Foundation at Yellow Creek
3.2 Objective
The ASRM project objective reflects the way we will
operate to accomplish our mission. Our objectives are:
• To embrace the principles and practices of good
process management
• For all employees to participate on a daily basis to
identify and eliminate waste from the processes
• For management at every level to become coaches
and mentors, empowering, enabling, and entrusting
fellow employees to improve the way we operate
• For all employees to be knowledgeable in the use and
application of systematic tools for continuous im-
provement
ORIGINAL PAGE
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• For all employees to know who "their" customers
are, both internally and externally
• For a communication network whereby every em-
ployee will know his/her customers' needs and will
apply the tools of process improvement to ensure that
these needs are met.
3.3 Goals
Our goals for Continuous Improvement are to achieve
a level of understanding whereby:
• All employees embrace the process of Continuous
Improvement
• All employees feel free to identify inefficiencies
• A level of customer satisfaction (internal and exter-
nal) is achieved that will cause customers to com-
mend the successful outcome of our processes and
increase their demand for our products and services.
4.0 Framework
4.1 Executive Council
The Executive Council is composed of the ASRM
Project Manager (Chairman), Deputy Project Man-
ager, President of Aerojet ASRM Division, Executive
Vice-President of Aerojet ASRM Division, and four
additional members selected at large.
Executive Council
o s • .... _
•- " Individual Employee
• q,
Working
PDT Group
Customer
Line Organization
This frameworkallows for effective/open communication
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The purpose of the Executive Council is to provide
guidance, implementation and awareness throughout
all levels of the organization, and to measure/track
progress.
4.2 Functional/Department
Staff Meeting
There are eleven ASRM functions. The functions are
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance; Facilities; System Engineering & Integra-
tion; Program Management& Control; Support
4.4 Working Group
A working group can be a subgroup of a PDT or
functional organization that focuses on an issue,
searches for solutions and reports weekly. The work-
ing group membership can be functional or cross
functional lines. The working group will generally be
a group of five or six members with knowledge of the
particular issue being worked.
4.5 Individual Employee
Equipment; Design Engineering; Manufacturing; _ __':_
Quality Assurance; Test Operations; Subcontract
Performance, and Project Planning & Control. The ,c.. :_
staff meetings are one arena for updating all department
employees on ongoing issues. This allows for input / .___
from co-workers as to possible solutions to issues.
4.3 Product Development Team (PDT) _ _!'_i,
Management must entrust individual employees by
encouraging them to recommend changes to improve
their work processes. The individual employee must be
given the opportunity to suggest possible process im-
provements and feel confident in doing so.
The PDT is one method we have employed to ensure
success of the ASRM team approach. The PDT is
composed of representatives from all functions, as well
as representatives from subcontractors (Aerojet ASRM
Division, Thiokol, and B&W). Each PDT holds regu-
larly scheduled meetings and is managed by selected
individuals from the Lockheed/Aerojet Team. The
PDT is a:
• Multi-organizational participation in design effort
• Arena for knowledge in the use and application of
systematic TQM tools
• Way of providing a communication network for
knowing the customer (intemal and external) and
his/her needs
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4.6 Customer
Our customer may be identified as an internal organi-
zation of the ASRM project as well as our contractual
customer. Since the focus of this entire plan is to meet
customer's needs, it is appropriate that our customer is
included in this team approach. We will continue to
solicit customer participation in our continuous im-
provement process in order to respond quickly to
changing needs.
5.0 Measurement and Reporting
Continuous improvement must be measured and re-
ported. The measurement system will verify the progress
of improvement efforts. When properly performed, a
measuring and reporting system furnishes accurate,
systematic and objective data that provides employees
and customer representatives with a clear understand-
ing of past performance. This system will also provide
a data base that can be used to facilitate improvements.
[ Measurement }k Tools
: ",,i!
Tracking
' X ]I Improvement Reporting[
6.0 Training/Education
To succeed, the ASRM work force from top manage-
ment to new employees must understand our approach
for continuous improvement. Management will
support and attend training/education efforts. The main
arena for education in the use of TQM tools and
Continuous Improvement is in the team approach.
7.0 Tools
Some of the continuous improvement and TQM tools
which will be utilized are:
• Brainstorming
• Flow charts
• Histogram
• Cause and effect diagrams
• Quality planning spreadsheets
• Designed experiment (Taguchi)
• Statistical analysis/process control
• Measurement system analysis
• Pareto analysis
• Plan-do-check-act
• And others
lMFInn
Pareto Diagram
/
Statistical
Analysis
Cause & Effect Diagram
Trend Analysis Flow Chart Process Control
8.0 Recognition
Recognition of significant contributions by individu-
als or teams will generally take place through public
acknowledgement of their work in the presence of their
peers. This recognition is the responsibility of the
functional organization.
Team recognition will be a priority of the Executive
Council.
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Recognitionwill consistof, butwill notbelimitedto
thefollowingoptions:
I. Awardof Achievement
2. Personalletterof commendation
3. Verbalcommendationi groupsetting
4. One-on-onehandshakeandthank-you
5. Promotions,bonuses,andmeritincreases
6. Luncheonsto honorexemplaryindividualor
teamperformances
7. Peer-initiatedawards
8. Payforperformance
9.0 Summary
Our objective is to achieve a level of understanding
whereby all employees embrace the approach of TQM
and Continuous Improvement. We strive to achieve
customer satisfaction by meeting the customer's needs
in providing a quality product on time and within
budget. •
High
A
81
¥
Expensive
Model T
Model T
Rolls Royce
TQM
Our Product Goal
Low Low
Quality •._ High
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Time 2
Percent Returns by Center
1O0
The GOOD news is you work for NASA
The BETTER news is you work for MSFC
The BEST news is "It's Getting Even BETTER!"
NASA Culture Study
Goal
• To understand the forces in the NASA culture that
potentially promote or inhibit the organization's
performance.
When
• NASA culture survey administered
Time 1: December 1986
Time 2: March-June 1989
Who
• Time 1:
- 3,008 NASA responses
- Overall return rate: >70 percent
• Time 2:
- 9,637 NASA responses
- Overall return rate: >47 percent
(Time 2 - sent 20,088 surveys)
Time 2
Center Return Rate
Date
May
Surveys Usable Percent
Center Sent Returns Returned
MSFC 3,340 1,671 50
Agency return rate: 47 percent
Demographics
Average Age
Avg. Yrs. NASA
Time 2
42.2
14.9
Time 1
44.3
17.6
NASA
1989
Population
43.3
14.3
What
A comprehensive look at what employees value,
believe, and perceive to be true about:
• NASA as an overall agency and what is important
in the respective centers.
• How they go about doing business i.e., "The way
we do things around here"
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Demographics
Gender
Female
Male
Time 2
_ 25.4%
23.0%
27.4%
74.6%
77.0%
72.6%
0 2o 40 60 8o
Percent
r--J Time 1 _ NASA Population
Doctorate
MAJMS/MBA
BA/BS
HS
_'_ Time 2
i
Demographics
Education
4.t%
] 4.1%
] 7.1%
19.9%
"_ 18.3%
J 17.1%
_ 66.4%
59.6%
_ 42.5%
9.6%
------_ 18.0%
_ 33.3%
I _L__ 6J0 t0 20 40 80
Percent
[_ Time 1 _ NASA Population
100
100
SES
GM 13 -15
GS13-18
GS7-12
GS1-6
Wage
Time 2
Demographics
Grade Level
3.0%
o.3%
2.2%
_ 9.1%
16.6%
_ 15.1%
_ 34.5%
I I oo%
_31.0%
_ 35.7%
I 131"4°/°
_ 36.8%
7,7%
11.4%
_10.0%
0.0%
0.3%
4.9%
o _'o
r-] Time 1
4'0 6b 8'o
Percent
NASA Population
100
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Demographics
Occupational Group-Time 2
Scie
andLife " 7 16.2% / \
Science _
Technical
Support
_ecretarial/
Clerical
White
Black
Hispanic
Native
American
Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Time 2
Demographics
Race/Ethnicity
1
_ 85.7%
8.3%
1.2%
2.9%
0.7%
0.3%
0.9%
0
2.7%
I I I !
20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Time 1(No Data) _ NASA Population
8O
Overall Satisfaction
By Grade Level
SES 4.138
4.03
3.80
GM 13-15
GS 13-18
GS 7-12
GS 1-6
Wage
3.97
4.16
I I I
2 3 4
Significant Differences Exist
The Culture Study
Each item in the culture questionnaire was rated
using the 5-point scale below:
I I I i I
l 2 3 4 5
Not Somewhat Very
Descriptive Descriptive Descriptive
Culture Findings
Section A:
Work Satisfaction
Work Satisfaction
Compared With Lowest and Highest Centers
Proud to Work
for NASA
Satisfied
with NASA
Satisfied
with Center
Optimistic About
NASA's Future
Satisfied
With Job
Satisfied With
Work Unit
I I I
2 3 4 5
Lowest Highest
Center _ Center ['"7 T2 Mean
Work Satisfaction
Time 2 Versus Time I
Proud to Work
for NASA
Satisfied
with NASA
*Satisfied
with Center
*Optimistic About
NASA's Future
Satisfied
With Job
Satisfied With
Work Unit
I
_/._'///////////////////////////A4.53
I
]4., ,8
3.93
13.79
Z////////////////////////_3.91
"///////////////////////_ 3.85
"////////////////////////A3.82
13.86
"//////////////////////jJ 3.62
13.72
I I I
2 3 4 5
Time2 [_1 Time1 *NewItem
8]
Culture Findings
Section B:
Work Unit Climate
Work Unit Climate
Compared With Lowest and Highest Centers
Members of My Work Unit . . .
Work Cooperatively
With Other Units
in Center
Strive To Do
Their Best
Trust One Another
Have Sufficient
Clarity Regarding
Expectations
Are Included in
Making Decisions That
Affect Their Work
Are Properly
Recognized For
Performance
I
2
Lowest Highest
Center _ Center
t ,L
3 4
T2 Mean
5
Work Unit Climate
Time 2 Versus Time 1
Members of My Work Unit...
Work Cooperatively
With Other Units in Center
Strive To Do Their Best
Trust One Another
Have Sufficient Clarity
Regarding Expectations
Are Involved in Making
Decisions That Affect
Their Work
Are Properly Recognized
For Performance
"///'///////////////,///////,.,_ 4.06
14.13
_3.91
13.86
_//'////////////////////./AI3.83
13.81
_3.60
]3.65
_//////////////////._3.55
13.05
3.33
13.29
Time 2 [_J Time 1
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Center Culture
• Organizational values
• Organizational effectiveness
• Loyalty
• Support
• Innovation
• Trust
• Adaptability
• Problem Solving
• Communications
• Rewards
• Power sharing
• Career development
• Decision making
• Senior management emphasis
In My Center, Org. Values Are...
Compared With Lowest and Highest Centers
II. Work Safety
I. Public Image
Image to Public
Org. Politics
III. Working Through
People
Challenging Work
Integrity
High Work Standards
Cooperation
Clear Goals
Employees
IV. Cultural Diversity
--p
p.
I I I
2 3 4
Lowest Highest
Center _ Center _ T2 Mean
No;e: Roman Numerals Regect Rank Order Which Appears in the Overall Agency Report
5
In My Center, Org. Values Are...
Time 2 Versus Time 1
Effectiveness is Measured by...
II. Work Safety
I. Public Image
Image to Public
Org. Politics
II!. Working Through
People
Challenging Work
Integrity
I
"/////////////////////////////X4.29
14"i6
3.95
3.95
High Work Standards _'////////////////////////JJ 3.83
I 14.02
I
Cooperation _]33.665
*Clear Goals
Employees
IV. *Cultural Diversity
3.65
_//////////////////_ 3.50
I I I
2 3 4
Time 2 [_] Time 1
"New Item
Note: Roman Numerals ReflecI Rank O_ef Which Appears in the Overall Agency Repod
83
]
1
II. Work Safety
In My Center, Org. Values Are...
What Is Versus What Should Be
0 20 40 60 80 100%
=4.1% J
i
I. Public Image
Image to Public
Org. Politics
II1.Working Through
People
Challenging Work
Integrity
High Work Standards
Cooperation
*Clear Goals
Employees
_"5.5% J
15% I
==a 17.2% ]
17.8% J
_,_, 17.1% J
IV, Cultural Diversity
=9-2% I
2-2% J
I 1 I
2 3 4
T2 Percentage _ T2 Mean
Note: Roman Numerals Reflect Rank Order Which Appears in the Overall Agency Report
Organizational Effectiveness
Compared With Lowest and Highest Centers
Effectiveness is Measured by, , .
Accomplishing
Goals
Acquiring Needed
Resources
Operating as a
Smoothly Run
Organization
J 1 i i
2 3 4 5
Lowest Highest
Center _ Center _ T2 Mean
Organizational Effectiveness
Time 2 Versus Time 1
Effectiveness is Measured by...
Accomplishing Goals
Acquiring Needed
Resources
Operating as a Smoothly
Run Organization
! 2 3 4 5
Time 2 r--I Time 1
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TQM
t
A
Top
Management
Leadership
and Support
TQM Benchmark
Senior Managers
personally and
visibly involved,
TQ culture
permeatesorganization.
Active removal of
barriers.
Senior Managers
participate in key
activities.
Departments
cooperate.Managers held
2
1
accountable for
quality.
Senior Managers
fully support TQ.
Adequate
resources
invented some
cross functional
implementation.
Many managers
support TQ,
Numerous
improvement
projects
underway. Cross
functional
implementation
encouraged.
Some managers
support TQ.
Some resources
allocated, but
few projects
underway.
B
Strategic
Planning
Planning effort is
integrated, cross
function and
centerwide.
Action plans
developed at all
levels. Customer
needs a pdmary
planning tool.
Action plans at
most levels.
Customer needs
a significant
factor in
planning. Many
planning
participants from
across the
organization.
'Action plans
developed in key
mission areas.
Broad
participation.
Customer needs
influence
planning.
Specific goals
established.
Customer needs
considered in
planning. Some
participation
from across the
organization.
General goals
established.
Customer needs
not central to
goal setting. Not
an integrated
effort.
C
Focus on the
Customer
and
Partners
Innovative
methods for
obtaining
customer
feedback.
Partnerships
established to
support
continuous
=mprovemant.
Effective
feedback system
for obtaining
customer
information and
improving
services.
Customer
feedback
regularly
solicited for
I management
action. Supplier
quality
monitored.
Customer
feedback
solicited on an
ad hoc basis_
Supplier
performance not
systematically
backed.
Customer
complaints
primary method
of feedback and
not systemati-
cally used to
improve
processes.
D
Employee
Training and
Recognition
All trained in
and using TQ.
Innovative
incentive
systems.
Comprehensive
systematic
training.
Nearly all using
TQ methods.
Team
achievement
widely
celebrated.
Almost all
trained in TQ.
Recognition of
teams for
continuous
_mprovement
efforts.
Significant
training
resources.
Managers and
some
i employees
trained in TQ.
Some rewards
for quality
improvements.
Some training
resources.
Minimal training
resources,
training at TQ
awareness
level. Mostly
managers.
Occasional
recognition
given.
E
Employee
Empowerment
and
Teamwork
Participative
management the
norm. Short chain-
of-command.
Employee
enthusiasm
apparent.
Widespread
participative
management and
downward
delegation. Team
ownership of
process
improvement.
Participative
management
style. Trust
growing between
managers and
employees.
Many managers
support teams.
Many employees
on teams. More
cross functional
cooperation.
Few quality
=mprovement
teams, traditional
management
style. Little cross
functional
cooperation.
F G
Continuous Continuous
Improvement Quality
Measurement Assurance
and Analysis Activity
Continuous
improvement
progress
tracked in all
areas. Process
! flow-time and
costs down In all
areas.
Continuous
improvement
progress
tracked in most
areas. Process
flow-time and
costs down in
key areas.
Quality data
often used to
track progress
and identify
_roblems/
solutions. Some
=mprovements
noted.
iSome units
collect and
analyze quality
data to prevent
errors.
Beginning
process and
product
improvement.
Quality control
by inspection or
review. Quality
data source.
Feedback
system in
planning stage.
Exceptional
results from
continual
assessment and
benchmarking of
all products,
services.
Positive
performancetrends from
systematic
assessment
benchmarking "_
for comparison, i ,_
Assessment of _,_
all products, 0
services for _z_outsid
customers and
most for internal _°
customers.
Most products.
services for
outside
customers
reviewed.
Positive results.
Some products,
services
reviewed to
meet customer
needs.
_,__IITi_NTtOeI_L] IIIL'Mtl PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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TQM Self Assessment
TQM
Element/
Status
Level
5
4
3
2
1
MSFC
Mean
Agency
Mean
Management
Leadership
and Support
10
7
6
12
7
3.02
2.44
Strategic
Planning
2
9
13
11
7
2.71
Focus on the
Customers
& Partners
1
10
8
16
7
2.57
Employee
Training &
Recognition
2
2
10
19
9
2.26
Employee
Empowerment
& Teamwork
3
9
12
8
10
2.69
2.46 2.59 2.08 2.43
Continuous
Improvement
Measurement
& Analysls
3
5
14
17
3
2.71
2.32
Continuous
Quality
Assurance
Activity
3
10
13
10
6
2.86
2.37
(u
E
t-
O
C
q)
m
E
5.0
4.5 f
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
TQM Benchmark Assessment
3.14
2.71 2.57
TQM Elements
Overall Center Average = 2.67
100
9O
80
p,
o 70
® 60t_
"6 50
40
= 30
2O
10
0
52
92
76
51
2 3 4
Status Level
23
5
BB Management
[] Planning
BI Customer
[] Recognition
Team Work
BB Analysis
Quality
88
30
TQM Status Level by Organization
25
4)
>
=, 20
E 10
HA SA CO FA EA BC STAFF PA AA TA KA JA
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
a.o
2.5
_2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
HA SA CO FA EA BC STAFF PA AA
.m
TA KA JA
[] Management [] Team Work
[] Planning [] Analysis
[] Customer [] Quality
[] Recognition
89
16
18
..J
& 12
10
=E6
t_
4
2
0
TQM Status Level by Organization
EA Projects Staff PA Institution
5.0
4.5 t4.0
"_ 3.5
=,
t
3.0
2.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
EA Projects Staff PA Institution
BB Management [] Team Work
[] Planning BB Analysis
[] Customer D Quality
[] Recognition
9O
IO0
90
"8
I: 80
0
70
" 60
G)> 50
" 40
0
E 20
z 10
Total of All Responses
2 3 4
TQM Status Level
E
Z
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Element A (Management)
14
12
10
j_ 8
E
= 6
z
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Element B (Planning)
L-
J_
E
Z
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Element C (Customers)
18
16
14
12
._1o
E
= 8
Z
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Element D (Recognition)
9]
Total of All Responses
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Element E (Teamwork)
14
12
10
8
.O
E
z 6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4
Element G (Quality)
5
1 2 3 4
Element F (Analysis)
5
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Communication Study Team
Report to Center Council
December 20, 1990
Study Objective
The objective of the Communication Study Team was
to examine problems or perceived problems in com-
munication and explore ways to improve them. Two
areas of communication were involved:
1) External to MSFC
2) Within MSFC
We are to explore innovative ideas/ways to communi-
cate more effectively.
Ask why we are doing things this way and is there a
better way.
Communications Study
Team Members
Robert Champion PD13, Chairman
Pegi Dunnigan CN44
Renee Ingersoll EL43
Bob Keasling AI32
Bill Simpson KA30
Jeff Spencer CQ22
Angela Stewart EO24
Agenda
Introduction
• Schedule
• Background and observations
Communication External to MSFC
• Education efforts
• Public image
• Intercenter competition
Communication Within MSFC
• Electronic mail
• Employee updates
• New hires
• Meetings/weekly notes
• Management<--> employees
- Openness
- Communication skills
• Other/general information
Recommendations/follow-on
Communication
Study Background
• Areas identified as needing further attention in 1989
culture study:
- Career development
- Decision making
- Rewards
- Power sharing
- Communications
• Communication study team set up by Mr. Bean
- Center-wide representation
- Employees with less than 5 years at MSFC
- 7-member team
• Past communication studies and surveys
- 1989 and 1986 culture study
- 1986 communication study team chaired by
Mr. Odom
- "TNT-Teams and Technology Dissertation"
by Jackie Kutsko
• 1,500 new employees have been hired over the last 4
years
• Over the past 15-20 years the emphasis on new
employee orientation has dropped off because new
employee hiring has only recently picked up.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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Communication Study Team Schedule
4II/90 511/90 6/1/90 7/1/90 8/1/90 9/1/90 10II/90 11/1/90 12II/90 1Ili91 2/1191
I Letter I ISolicitatlon
Nominations I
I '1st Meeting
t I
Study 89' Culture Study Results
J
I I I
Working Group Kickoff Meeting I
• Generate Suggestions From Each Team MemberI 1 I
J _11 Review '86 Communication Stud
PA01, CR01 CN4] Survey II
Revlew Compjlete Culture Study _11
Review Resident Office Study _11
i , Compile, Survey Responses _ ,!Compile All Suggestions Into One List ,
' I I i
FAX List to Members I
I I !
Distribute_ Surve_ Responses i
3rd Meeting Brainstorming Session II I
• Develop_ Outline_for Presentat__°nConsolidate Suggestion List, Include Survey
I 1 st ,os:,o e'anI
Follow Up Actions From 3rd Meeting Il '4th Meeting II
I
Devel?p Each Section IIII
Status to Mr. Bean |
/ Team Results
I I !
Briefed on WeekiYNotes Information Systems, II Prepare Draft Presentation
I I I
Briefed on Public Affairs Education Efforts I
I I I I
Briefed on Marshall Star PIP'S/New Hires I
Managemeni Training | Present to Mr. Bean
! Prepare Final Presentation _ I
I _. I
Present to Mr. Lee I rE
I I Present to Center Council L.,J
Cultural Study Observations
Communications spans almost all aspects of NASA
culture. The questions from the 1989 survey show this.
• People orientation is an important criterion for the
advancement of managers
Decisions
• Decisions are based on open discussion and debate of
facts. Once a decision is made, management commu-
nicates the results and rationale to employees
Loyalty
• MSFC is effective in orienting new employees
Support
• There is a willingness to collaborate across organi-
zational units within MSFC
Rewards
• The performance appraisal system provides a useful
forum for discussion of work performance
Trust
• Employees can say what is right without fear of
reprimand from management
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Power
• We talk about teamwork and sharing, but people
quietly hold on to their power and authority
Problem Solving
• Issues can be discussed clearly and openly without
having a negative impact on personal relationships
Organizational Functioning and Adaptability
• Employees at MSFC have clear concepts of their
own roles and how they relate to the roles of others
Communication External to MSFC
With Public Media
We must do a better job of promoting ourselves and the
value of engineering and science to our nation.
• Encourage middle management to support employee
public speaking
• Provide special recognition and incentives for
involved employees
• Provide public speaking training to selected
employees
• Increase emphasis to educate the work force on
NASA school initiatives (Star, NASA updates)
• Increase resources to support for school initiatives
(Spacemobile, Project LASER, etc.)
With Other Centers
Unhealthy competition exists among NASA centers.
• Encourage the use to tele/videoconferencing more
accessible
• Encourage temporary personnel assignments among
centers
• Provide clearer definition of tasks among NASA
center early in program
Communications Within MSFC
Electronic Communications
MSFC could more effectively use its computer
resources.
• Commit to transition to a paperless system
• Provide transparent communication across existing
systems (X.400 addressing)
• Make systems compatible
• Educate employees on existing capabilities
Employee Updates
Viewing updates is difficult at times.
• Reserve conference rooms for employees updates
• Establish a standard time for employee updates
• Add monitors, as necessary (could be in branch
chief' s office)
New Hires
The professional intern program needs to be
standardized.
• Require PIP's to have 2-3 rotations of three months
each
• Require meeting with new station to list duties and
responsibilities
• Mandatory briefing by lab directors and organiza-
tions
Staff Meetings
Need for more face-to-face communication.
• Have weekly branch meetings
• Have quarterly office/lab director meetings with all
employees
Weekly Notes
Purpose of weekly notes is misunderstood.
• Should not be mandatory (quota) or part of perfor-
mance appraisal
• Use activity reports for performance items instead of
weekly notes
• Distribute lab/office/center notes quickly, use
electronic mail/bulletin boards
Management/Employee Openness
Nobody likes to be "kept in the dark".
• Conduct informal but scheduled walk-throughs by
all levels of management to "break the ice" and
promote team spirit
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Hold lessinformationinconfidence
Publishuser-friendlymemos,explainingthepromo-
tion,award,andhiringprocessesandallocations
Invite/encouragepersonnelto attendprojectoffice
meetings
Don'thoardinformation,keepit flowing
Management Communication Skills
Some managers have poor people skills.
• Work on better team building skills
• Establish center emphasis on enhanced communica-
tion skills
• Include people skills in evaluation process for poten-
tial managers
• Include communications and human relations ini-
tially in training of pre-supervisors
• Include people skills in performance plans of all
supervisors
Communications Within MSFC
Other/General Information
Employees need a better understanding of what goes
on around MSFC.
• Use public address system to notify employees of
significant events, especially those scheduled on
short notice
• Bulletin boards need to be updated, revamped, and
placed better
• Expand the Marshall Star or perhaps begin an em-
ployee newsletter
- Include a paragraph once a month on what PD,
S&E, or I&PS is doing
- Monthly pictorial focus on a certain division/
branch activity
- Have an editorial section to accept comments
and respond to questions
- Include human interest stories
• Encourage lab/office newsletters-OK reproduction
• Re-look the purpose of the weekly bulletin
Team Building
Team concept is
concept.
often overridden by employee
Form teams on a proactive rather than a reactive
level, include representatives from different areas
Make management aware of the communication
concern, instruct management to encourage involve-
ment, solicit employee feedback on management
performance
Recognize nontechnical support contributions
Recommendations/Follow-On
Activities
• Recent MSFC achievements:
- Daily Planet
- Employee handbook
- TQM seminars
- Furlough warning
- Supervisor handbook
- CCTV used for picnic announcement
- Career development handbook
- Limited use of public address system
Recommendations
• Communications with public/media
-Make education work more visible to public
and employees
• Communications within NASA
-Provide for more intercenter interchange,
reduce conflicts
• Communications within MSFC
-Make center priority/commitment to improving
communications known
- Make employee updates more effective
- Train new employees more consistently
- Improve use of staff/employee meetings
-Improve team building and communication
skills
- Rethink the purpose of the Marshall Star
- Encourage more use of electronic mail
• Select changes to implement
• Implementation options
-Establish teams with senior management
involvement to oversee and monitor progress
- Perform within management structure
• Must have management commitment and direction
at all levels
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Aquisition
Enhancement Survey
L. Mullins and L. Zoller
The acquisition enhancement survey was initiated by
the Center Director in April 1990, as part of the Total
Quality Management (TQM) effort.
The survey findings and recommendations are con-
tained herein.
Issues
• The perception being that:
- We can't "control" programs
- We can't "get anything through procurement"
• Do we need to OVERHAUL the acquisition process
• Can the acquisition process be further streamlined?
Notes
The acquisition enhancement survey study was under-
taken with the participation of the Center organizations
to establish an understanding of what the current pro-
cesses entail, the origin of requirements, and if, or how,
they might be modified to be more responsive to user
needs and more successful in terms of Total Quality
Management.
The findings and recommendations represent the col-
lective input of many person s from all Center elements.
Global Findings
Acquisition policies, procedures, and system are fun-
damentally SOUND.
Acquisition enhancement efforts are being
implemented.
• Automated Procurement Request System (APRS)
• Off-the-shelf software procurements (<$1K)
• Restock of supplies
• Off-the-shelf training package procurement
• Streamlined SEB/C process by Headquarters
• Standardization of documentation
• FIP (ADPE) procurement through BCSS contract
Achieved programmatic results are disappointing.
Attention is needed on fundamentals, as well as oppor-
tunities for process streaming.
Notes
While the procurement process is highly successful in
terms of accomplishing and sustaining contractor
selections, the attendant consumption of time and
resources, and subsequent cost growth, schedule slip-
page, and untimely-sometimes, erroneous-deliveries
signal undesirable programmatic results. Identified
programmatic problems and sluggishness in the acqui-
sition process are due more to laxity in the application
of established management principles and excesses
approvals and conservatism than to any fundamental
fault of the process. There is generally sound rationale
and logic for the steps in the acquisition process,
although several post-selection steps (e.g., technical
evaluation, pricing, and pre-negotiation
objectives) could be eliminated through incorporation
in SEC/SEB documentation. Achievement of TQM
lies in the process implementation through delegation
of responsibility and authority, communication and
training, standardization, and, in certain areas, meth-
odology and role changes.
Z's Therorems
• Programmatic growth is a function of Avagadro's
number.
• The "big view" of SE&I is myopic.
• The buck may stop with Harry Truman, but the
project manager will cash it in.
• The number of reviews is measured in centipoise.
• ADPE items tend to be obsolete before receipt.
• The cost of small purchases is expended before
award.
PRE- CEDli' PAGEBLANKNOTFILMED
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Procurement Lead Time
>$25M
SEB
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Notes
The process lead time is proportional to the number of
MSFC reviews and approvals on each procurement;
thus, the potential for streamlining and reducing lead
time is related to delegation of authority and
responsibility:
Major system contract
Mission contract
Service contract
AE contract
Construction contract
ADPE procurement
Goods procurement
Sealed
Bid
=100
=175
_-100
SEC/C
--15O
--15O
=75
=20O
=125
SEB/C
=275
=200
=200
Notes
Statutory and policy times stipulations, together with
maximum compression of all other events, account for
about one half of the experienced procurement lead
time:
Minimum Elapsed Time
SEB SEC
Regulation 80 days 65 d
NASA policy 61 24
MSFC policy 14 9
Evaluation
(initial and BAFO) 40 40
Other 27 16
222 d 154 d
Historical --410 d =350 d
Small
General Pur.
51 d
4 1
!5 31
70 d 32 d
=150 d =75-100 d
102
<$25K
;25-500K
;0.5-10M
t;10-25M
>$25M
Contract Awards
D Awards IBIB Value
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90100
Percent
Notes
While major procurements get the most visibility, the
preponderance of annual procurements are small pur-
chases which consume extensive effort:
Awards Value
Small purchases
(<$25 K) =4,900 =91% $30 M =1%
General contracts
($25-$500 K) =400 =8% $46 M =2%
Contracts
($500 k-$10 M) =40 =8% $85M =4%
Typical SEC actions
($10-$25 M) =8 =0.2% $95 M =4%
Typical SEB actions
(>$25 M) ---9 =0.2% $1,876 M =89%
=5,357 $2,132 M
Furthermore, there is a high volume of change traffic to
existent contracts:
Changes orders =524 $2,249 M
Acquisition Survey
• Procurement of goods
• FIP (ADPE) procurements
• Facility contracts
• Service contracts
• Mission contracts
• Major systems acquisitions
Notes
Step-by-step flow charts, starting with procurement
requirements initiation through contract award, were
developed and analyses were done for the following
spectrum of procurement types:
• Procurement of goods-frequent use of small
purchase practices.
• Federal Information Processing (FIP) procurements-
extensive external constrained major source of user
frustration (formerly ADPE)
• Facility contracts-formal process with high congres-
sional visibility (AE or sealed bid procurements).
• Service contracts-specialized negotiated contracts
with some unique requirements
• Mission contracts-wide range of negotiated
contracts (typical user technical evaluation or SEC
process).
• Major systems acquisition-endemic programmatic
growth and high visibility (SEB process).
Procurement of Goods and ADPE
• Process takes too long and consumes the time of too
many people.
• FIPS (ADPE) constraints are, or will be, crippling.
• Data deficiencies and overly restrictive requirements
cause delays.
• Users are frustrated by lack of status reports, and,
sometimes, receipt of wrong items.
Notes
The more familiar term, Automatic Data Processing
Equipment (ADPE), addressed here, is now embraced
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withinthebroadertermFederalInformationProcess-
ing(FIP)resources.
Typicalprocurementapprovalcycletimetocontract
award:
Small
Purchases Request Procurement Total
Goods =30 days =40 days =70 days
FIP (ADPE) =60 days =40 days =100 days
Other (>$25 k)
Goods =40 days =90 days --130 days
FIP (ADPE) =100 days =90 days =190 days
Approval Levels
Center Dir
Deputy
Directorate
Deputy
Lab or Office
Deputy
Division
Deputy
Branch
MMI 5101.5F
Procurement Cost Range
• AOO = HST = PD
= Staff • PPO • S&E
'_ I&PS = SSPO
• SPO • SS
Notes
The "F" revision of MMI 5101.5 is a significant step in
delegation of authority and responsibility, but
desparities exist in the organizational approval levels
for procurement requests (including differences within
AOO and I&PS between Forms 55 and 404). Delega-
tion of approval authority and responsibility to the
lowest practical level is in keeping with TQM, and will
facilitate APRS implementation.
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The average number of individuals in a procurement
request of <$25 k (extracted from APRS) is:
S&E 7
CN (catalog screening) 1.5
AI/BCSS (FIPs only) 6
BF (funds authorization) 1
AP ( PROMIS log in) 2
17.5
Naturally, the number increased with procurement
value.
Procurement of Goods and ADPE
Potential Enhancements
General (non-SEB/C)
• Minimize approvals and fully implement APRS.
Phase out S&E Form 424.
• Delegate most "special approvals" to Property Man-
agement Division (MMI 5105.5F).
• Fully staff procurement office or contract small
purchases (<$25 k) services.
• Maximize use of indefinite quantity and GSA sched-
ule buys, and credit cards.
Notes
Procurement streamlining and APRS will be effective
ONLY if the approvals are minimized. MMI 5101.5F
should be revised to further delegate responsibility and
authority, to make ap_provals the same forForms 55 and
404, and to assign the preponderance to "special ap-
provals" (attachment C) to Property Management Di-
vision. For example:
• ADPE and telecommunications equipment (items
#1,4, 8 k, and 9c)-A101
• Safety or security equipment (item #3)-CS01 or
CN51
• Consultants (items #8b)-DA01
• Exhibits (item #Se)-CA01
• Most, if not all, others-CN41 (provide adequate
guidelines and staffing)
APRS updates and full implementation should be
expedited. S&E Form 424 would be obviated for
procurement by APRS, and could phased out.
Somesmallpurchasesaremadethroughinstitutional
contracts;contractingforservicesfortheremainderof
smallpurchaseswouldrelievetheprocurementoffice
for morecriticalandchallengingwork(91percentof
all contractawardsate<$25k),andshouldbegiven
seriousconsideration.
Significantefficiencieswouldresultfrombuyers,and,
possibly,Directorate/OfficeAdministrativeOfficials
usingcreditcardsforsmall(<$1k),localnon-competi-
tivepurchases(anAPRSsampleshows50percentof
smallpurchaseswere<$lk).
Procurement of Goods and ADPE
Potential Enhancements
(continued)
General (non-SEB/C)
• Provide center-wide procurement training and guid-
ance materials (NET)
• Consolidate tracking and status of procurements
through a single system.
• Confirm requirements and responses with initiators.
Notes
Many of the issues identified through the survey in-
dicate the need to center-wide training relative to the
procurement process, and end-to-end tracking and
status:
• User frustrations (P-9)
• Data deficiencies in procurement requests (P-9)
• High initial rejection rate (70 percent) on FIPs pro-
curements
• Technical evaluation delays (P-15)
• SEB/C learning curve
Suggest forming a NET with S&E EM, Labs, AP20,
CN41, and BF30 to further examine expediting pro-
curements and training for center personnel in the
overall process, rationale for requirements, and the
specifics of procurement request preparation and
evaluations.
The multiplicity of procurement processing and track-
ing system (S&E ordering system, APRS, BCSS-
CAMS, PROMIS, etc.) should be consolidated to pro-
vide end-to-end tracking. APRS seems like the best
vehicle to adapt, through incorporation of the procure-
ment office functions. BCSS should be encouraged to
use APRS or FIPs procurements. Until APRS, with its
user accessibility for status, is fully implemented,
initiators should be kept informed of procurement
status.
Buyers/negotiators should verify the content of re-
quests (RFQ, RFP, IFB) and responses (quotes, pro-
posals, for bids) with the initiator before consumma-
tion of contracts.
<$25K
$25-100K
o
_=
_" $100-2501<
$.25-2.5M
>$2.5M
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Notes
Almost all software and hardware procurements are
within the MSFC approval authority and the prepon-
derance are small purchases; thus, there is real oppor-
tunity for streamlining the system:
,f f j ooO"
<$25 k _-96% =91% =94% 1,813 =$9.4 M
$25-100 k =3% =7% _-5% 101 =$4.3 M
$100-250 k =1% =1% =1% 19 =$3.6 M
$0.25-25 M - =0.3% =0.2% 4 =$6.1 M
>$25 M - =0.2% =0.1% 2 =$8.1 M
Assignment of all off-the-shelf software and hardware
procurements <$25 k to BCSS would nearly eliminate
the demands on the procurement office for FIPs
resources. Eventually the level could be raised to
$250 k, which is also consistent with the headquarters
requirement approval of any restrictive competition.
FIP (ADPE) Procurements
• Seek sensible relief from statutory and GSA con-
straints.
• Streamline ISO/BCSS review process. (NET)
• Eliminate PMD screening to ADPE.
• Assign all off-the-shelf ADPE procurements <$25k
to BCSS.
• Streamline FIP acquisition plan approval.
Notes
The regulations applicable to FIPs resources are ever
expanding. While the motivation to achieve thorough
planning, uniformity competition is good, the process
is counter productive. Innovative steps can and are
being made within the regulations, but the issue needs
to be addressed at the agency and congressional level.
The center director can approve most procurements up
to $25 M, but only to $2.5 M for F1Ps.
The review process within ISO and BCSS can involve
two dozen persons for procurements >$250 k. A NET
is being formed to further examine the process with the
expectation of making major revisions. The potential
exists to reduce the number of steps by at least half.
Due to the rapid obsolescence of ADPE, screening
surplus lists for requested items has a success rate of an
1 percent (61 items valued at $219k). GSA has discon-
tinued cataloging items <$ IM (FIRMR 201-33.001 );
there is little value to screening agency surplus. The
Property Management Division (PMD) screening, on
average, adds 3-4 days to the procurement processing.
The Long Form Acquisition Plan review and approval
(currently involving up to 23 people) should be limited
to AI01; Chief, Procurement Policy and Review Branch;
Deputy Director AA01; and the center director. Infor-
mation copies might be provided to others. The cover
letter should be replaced by a routing slip for center
level approvals.
Contract Acquisitions (Mission,
Service, Facilities)
• Most contracts are let at the end of the fiscal year, and
little cost is accrued.
• Sound facility design is compromised by the funding
approval cycle and immaturity of requirements.
• Technical evaluation delays are not uncommon.
Notes
Facility engineering and design dilemma
Congressional appropriation bill
Headquarters decision meetings
Project funding approval
Contract award
Results for next budget cycle
Finalization of budget data
=November
Mid-December
January-February
=May
Mid-July
October
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Contract Acquisitions
Potential Enhancements
SEB/C Process
Potential Enhancements
Contracts
• Fund contracts and purchases, especially for S&E,
early in the fiscal year. Earmark funds for specific
procurements.
• Baseline facility requirements for PER.
• Advance headquarters PER approvals and/or center
procurement preparation. (NET)
• Develop evaluation forms and stress priority of tech-
nical evaluations.
Notes
Institutional and Project Operating Plans need to pro-
vide early fiscal year funding for contracts and pur-
chases so that awards can be made and cost (as well as
results) accrued. Project funding should be transferred
to S&E, or other offices in the first quarter of the fiscal
year that funds can be earmarked for procurements; if
funds are not committed by the second quarter of the
fiscal year, they could be recalled and reprogrammed.
Rather than in-line project approval of procurement
requests (MMI 5101.5F, attachment B), information
copies should be used.
A facility user requirements document should be under
a form of configuration control starting with the PER
solicitation, and strong user input is needed early in the
design.
Making Preliminary Engineering Report (PER) funds
available in first quarter fiscal year and/or completion
of procurement packages for release upon funds
approval should be explored with headquarters codes
H and NX. Some "wasted" effort is to be expected. A
NET within facilities and procurement offices is sug-
gested. A stronger code M advocacy for facility projects
would be beneficial.
Delays in finalizing technical evaluations are due both
to inadequate guidance for and low l_riority by the
evaluators. Clear instructions and samples should be
provided by the Procurement Office, and management
should stress timeliness. A "fill in the blanks" form
based upon the RFP criteria should be used for non-
SEB/C proposal evaluations. Specific deadlines and
status checks are needed to preclude stagnation.
RFPPrep
ProposalPrep
InitialEval.
Comp.Range
BAFD
FinalEvat.
Selection
Tech.Eval.
Pricing
Pre-Neg.
Negotiations
ContractAppr.
SEB/C Process
Potential Enhancements
IIIIIII
I
PotentialCandidates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Months
11 12 13 14 15
Notes
Statutory and policy time stipulations, together with
maximum compression of all other events, yield the:
Minimum Elapsed _me
SEB SEC
Regulation 80 days 65 d
NASA Policy 61 24
MSFC policy 14 9
Evaluation (initial and BAFO) 40 40
Other 27 16
222 d 154 d
In reality, the elapsed time is nearly doubled:
Historical =410 d =350 d
The greatest potential for streamlining is in minimizing
the written/oral discussions and BAFO cycle, and the
post-selection activities.
Programmatic Requirements
• Put emphasis on programmatic review ofRFP (WBS,
SOW, Specifications).
• State Government "requirements" as such.
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• Focusevaluationsubfactorsandproposalinstruc-
tionsonprogrammaticrisks.
• Minimizecontractdocumentation.
Notes
The programmatic and technical material is the RFP
should be thoroughly reviewed for comprehensiveness
and consistency to assign total responsibility to the
contractor (unless there are specific NASA tasks). The
WBS should be structured to logically organize work
authorization and cost collection. The programmatic
review takes on new importance with the trend toward
smaller SEB/C's; the review might be accomplished
through the advisory council or, perhaps, a group
empaneled from various organizations.
When the Government knows, from experience, how
they want the project structured, it should be stated in
the RFP rather than leaving it open as a pseudo-
discriminator. Reprogramming during negotiations is
questionable.
In recognition of prior problems on major programs,
suggested mission suitability subfactors are provided
on the next page to address those issues. Standard, but
not flexible, guides for subfactors and proposal prepa-
ration instructions could be developed for the various
types of contracts.
Deliverable documentation competes for funds with
other work and should be minimized with the lowest
possible approval level. Consideration should be given
to substituting presentations (revised and baselined)
for most of the "plans." Deliverables should be limited
to those needed for Government action, accounting,
authorization, or archiving. Current efforts to stan-
dardize documentation requirements should be expe-
dited.
SEB/C Process (general)
' Consist with smaller SEB/Cs, the center must assign
top people and provide staffing,
• Consider a permanent SEB/C group.
• Standardize cost proposals (include in page limita-
tions). (NET)
• Limit plans delivered with proposal.
Notes
A permanent SEB/C group, augmented by specialists,
would be consistent with reducing the size of evalua-
108
tion teams and improving productivity, and would
provide continuity and opportunities for standardiza-
tion of documentation and evaluation techniques. The
organization should encompass recorders, general
management and business analysts, general technical
analysts, and cost analysts. While the board should not
be permanently staffed, some membership from the
organization, perhaps the management and technical
committee chairpersons, should be included for conti-
nuity and efficiency.
Simplification of cost proposal requirements can be
done and would be of mutual benefit to the Govern-
ment and industry. In effect, two cost proposals (con-
tractor and Government fiscal year) are required for
pricing and SEB evaluation. The need for a common
data base is obvious, and would be an appropriate topic
for a NET. Insistence on total scope control could de-
emphasize the cost proposal detail and focus on pro-
gram content, integration, and control. With the use of
diskettes for data, cost proposals should be included
within proposal page limitations.
Deliverable plans should be limited, for example, to
development and verification, manufacturing, and fa-
cilities, (if substantial).
SEB/C Process (general) (continued)
• Streamline past performance and key personnel
evaluations.
• Insist on good initial proposals and minimized dis-
cussions and BAFO.
• Expand inclusion of pre-negotiation objectives in
the SEB/C presentation.
• Use SEB/C report in lieu of technical evaluation and
pricing report.
Notes
Past performance-proper emphasis contemplated a
uniform data base which never materialized (but, if
continued, should be developed); curreni process is
time-consuming and findings are very subjective, and,
generally, inconsequential. Procurement office could
screen offeror's for debarment, ineligibility, suspen-
sion, and contract terminations (lack of prior Govern-
ment or NASA cont/acts by the performing activity
should be noted under experience).
Key personnel-eliminate as a separate subfactor, ex-
cept, possibly, for service contracts, and treat distinct
strengths and weaknesses as part of the management
subfactor. Fact finding is time-consuming and highly
subjective.
Emphasize clause 52.215-16 Contract Award (April
1985), and restrict discussions, if compelling, to items
such as terms and conditions. The agency should move,
through regulatory changes, toward maintaining BAFO
submission a Government option rather than a
necessity.
A separate technical evaluation and pricing report may
be required for major fact finding changes; but, pricing
data could otherwise be a part of the SEB/C report,
especially for total scope control.
Major System Acquisition
• Buy-in syndrome.
• Inadequate and unstable early year funding.
• Inadequate systems engineering.
• Inadequate design margins.
• Inadequate attention to manufacturing and opera-
tional requirements in design.
• Inadequate programmatic discipline.
Notes
The most prevalent causes of project problems were
compiled from discussions with project managers and
others.
These observations are supported by an assessment of
the sources of program cost growth on a number on a
number of projects (page 23).
None of these issues is a"breakthrough;" each has been
addressed in existing policies, procedures, or hand-
books; but, there is obvious evidence of laxity in
implementation.
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Sources of Cost Growth
Notes
An analysis of project cost growth factors for a number
of projects reflects the following trend:
Requirements changes =45%
Overruns =30%
Reprogramming =25%
These data are supportive of the principal causes of
project problems derived from discussion with project
personnel.
Considerations for mitigating these growth factors are
addressed on the following charts.
Major System Acquisition
Potential Enhancements
Major System Acquisition
Potential Enhancements
Requirements definition
• Strengthen phase A and B study teams.
• Revitalize system engineering.
• Fund phase A and B studies adequately for:
-Detailed system and program analyses, and
subsystem design concepts
- Proof of concept and processes.
-Environmental impact and institutional require-
ments analyses.
• Better utilize pre-development reviews.
Notes
Phase A and B study teams need greater involvement
from S&E, SRM&QA, and the anticipated project
management and engineering personnel, as well as
personnel from influencing centers and projects to
establish comprehensive requirements.
Systems engineering, here, is meant to be the continu-
ing, interdisciplinary, technical and programmatic
analyses, of: requirements and sensitivities; techni-
cal risks and mitigation; design margins; design
functionality in terms of optimum manufacturability,
operability, and maintainability; design solutions and
problem resolutions in terms of total system simplic-
ity and integrity; test planning to achieve nominal and
off-nominal characterization; and performance in terns
of repeatability, reliability,and design feedback. Things
like design evolution reviews (PRR, PDR, CDR...) and
configuration management must be recognized as
TOOLS of system engineering.
Empirical proof of concept work and risk analyses
should embrace any new materials, processes, or tech-
nology in general, and include breadboards, etc...
The stringency of current and future environmental
constraints may influence construction, manufactur-
ing, and test operations, and must be included in phase
A and B studies to determine any design or program-
matic impacts. Similarity, institutional impacts need to
be identified to preclude implementation delays.
Thorough pre-development reviews should be used in
preparation for the headquarters acquisitions and the
non-advocate reviews.
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Major System Acquisition
Potential Enhancements
Reprogramming
25%
Requirements
Changes "-
45%
Overrun Mitigation
• Establish initial project estimates as ranges with
reassessment and commitment at CDR.
• Strengthen RFP requirements for comprehensive,
integrated implementation planning.
• Insist on budget contingency, and give project man-
ager reasonable flexibility.
• Insist upon use of PMS discipline.
Notes
Project cost commitments are made too early in the
definition phase (years before receipt of proposals) to
have long-term credibility. Initial cost and schedule
estimates should be given as ranges. Cost estimates
must be reviewed for comprehensiveness (project and
institution support for all centers, impact to other
projects, operational impacts, etc.). Phase C/D con-
tracts should encompass the entire DDT&E, but be
structured in detail through CDR with a requirements
for submittal of cost and schedule estimates-to-com-
plete at that time. The Government would evaluate the
proper course of action (continue, restructure, termi-
nate), and, unilaterally, reconsider the fee structure
based upon the contractor performance and external
project impacts. There is too much cost and schedule
pressure at the beginning of Phase C/D for sound
management.
Contractor buy-in must be discouraged, in part through
the RFP, by de-emphasis of the cost factor through
stressing integrity and comprehensiveness of program
planning, and by insisting that cost estimates be based
upon total scope accountability with few, if any, antici-
pated changes; and by disqualification of unreasonable
cost estimates. (see page 19)
Budget estimates and commitments must include re-
serves for changes and growth. Based upon the offeror
estimate and project complexity, the reserves could be
significant. Project managers should have realistic
contingency each year for effective management.
The most important aspect of PMS is the management
discipline that it imposes. Contractors can maximize
the currency of the data reports.
Overrun Mitigation (Continued)
• Implement total scope control rather than design
control.
• Maintain project management continuity.
• Strengthen business management capability (or ac-
quire support service contractor(s)).
• Change penalization of underruns.
Notes
The Government assumes too much responsibility for
contract mission objectives prior to qualification;
thereby, causing excessive change traffic (see page 7).
Approvals of documentation and design review should
confirm compliance and adequacy; the contractor is to
maintain configuration control. Out-of-scope changes
should be restricted to the CEI specifications or ICD's,
quantity of deliverable, or schedule accelerations. To-
tal scope control will not preclude cost growth, but both
in-house and contractor administrative costs should be
reduced. Award fee would be a more powerful man-
agement tool.
Project personnel should be assigned during phase B
studies to establish and maintain strategies for the
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program.Ideally,theprojectmanagerandchiefengi-
neershouldbeontheSEB.Whentheinevitableprob-
lemsoccur,removalof in-houseorcontractormanage-
mentshouldbeavoidedunlesstherearealsofunda-
mentalchangesindirection.
Thecomptroller'sofficetrainingprogramwill beginto
addresstheneedforprogramanalysts,butthebusiness
managementcapabilitymustbeaddressedbroadly.
Traininganddiscussionforumswouldbebeneficial
for currentanalyststo shareexperiencesandtech-
niques.Businessmanagementareas houldbeevalu-
ated to determinewhereselectivehiring would
strengthenthecenter.
Currentbudgetarypracticespromotecompliancewith
theannualcostplanratherthanresults;thus,thereis
little incentiveto savemoney.
Major System Acquisition
Potential Enhancements
Overrun
3O%
Requirements
Changes
.............45°/o. .
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Reprogramming Mitigation
• Stabilize early year (=3 years) funding and stipulate
in RFP (headquarters commitment).
• Defer contractual reprogramming until impacts are
really known, if early year funding does change
(e.g., PDR or CDR)
Notes
The agency tendency is to "aft load" the funding of
development projects, whereas early expenditures are
required to establish a sound technical base and pre-
clude later cost growth due to deferred risk.
The vacillation of early year funding guidelines is more
detrimental than a lower, but known, funding schedule,
since it drains manpower for "what if...?" studies and
continuous reprogramming.
It would be more prudent to commit to fiscal year
funding levels through CDR and reassess the estimate-
to-complete at that time. There would be adequate
maturity at CDR to effect any needed reprogramrning
for the remainder of the DDT&E, and reprogramming
impacis (6ther than schedule acceleration) would be
minimal prior to CDR.
Alternate Acquisition Approach
Down selection from rnuitiple, adequately funded phase
B studies to a single phase C/D contractor.
• Could make phase B studies more realistic and
reduce risk for phase C/D
• Could provide more substantive data for selection.
• Should substantially reduce the "procurement pro-
cess" and selection time.
• Should make betteruse ofcontractorresources (IR&D
and B&P).
Notes
Following the concept of OMB circular A- 109, major
system acquisitions, down selection from multiple,
competitively selected phase B study contracts to a
single phase C/D contractor could improve the techni-
cal and programmatic maturity going into certain, but
not necessarily all, phase C/D programs, and signifi-
cantly reduce the transitio (procurement) period be-
tween the two phases.
Contractual, and political, provisions for down se-
lection would have to be addressed in the phase B
competitive procurement.
The NASA proposed phase C/D contract would be
provided to phase B contractors, perhaps, midway
through the study.
Final study report, encompassing the preliminary
design concept and rationale, CEI specifications,
proof of concept results, and phase C/D implemen-
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C-'2___
tation plans, as well as deviations to the NASA
proposed contract and Form 1411 cost proposal
would constitute the phase C/D proposal.
Alternative Acquisition
Approach
i
Parallel, iEillill l I
Competitive
Phase B
!/Studies inliiii i i
Tech. Eval. i_ _FPricing , I
l
Selection _.
I
Negotiations _1
i
Contract Appr. E i
123456
Months
Notes
Greater maturity of design, development, and planning
resulting from more intense phase B studies should
contribute to phase C/D requirements and program-
matic stability. Down selection would preclude a con-
tractor from holding back features for the phase C/D
proposal (or BAFO).
Contractors, and NASA, would be motivated to assign
anticipated project implementation personnel during
phase B. Contractor teams could be maintained
throughout the --3 month technical selection period
(direct funding or B&P) to finalize detailed, integrated
program plans (cost, schedule, content) for negotia-
tions and for PMS baseline, with the stipulation that the
previously proposed cost and fee (Form 1411) are for
total accountability.
Alternative Acquisition Approach
!
Typical Deletions in Process Flow
Notes
A down selection process would necessitate the same
objectivity and discipline as the current SEB process,
but a significant number (=60 percent) of the competi-
tive procurement steps could be eliminated (dark boxes
in the extract from the flow chart).
• A panel or SEB would report findings to a source
selection official.
• Preponderance of solicitation steps would be
eliminated.
• Discussions and BAFO would be eliminated.
• A source selection statement would be required.
• Debriefings would be granted.
Principal source of a protest would be an allegation of
transfusion of prejudicial information during the phase
B study. Given the NASA culture to strive with each
contractor towards the best solution (a major departure
from a tenet of OMB Circular A- 109 implementation),
selection criteria would have to be desensitized to
transfusion. Selection might be based upon adequacy
of system engineering, design maturity and compli-
ance with specification requirements, program risk,
phase C/D implementation plans, responsiveness to
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proposedcontract,demonstratedteamperformance,
andcostproposal(simplified).
Acquisition Enhancement Survey
• Positive steps are being taken.
• Significant opportunities exist for further
enhancements
- Suggested action plans.
- Recommended NET formation.
- Cultural changes are needed.
• Exchange of ideas with headquarters and other cen-
ters should be pursued.
Notes
Flow charts for each type of procurement surveyed
provide center-wide reference tools, and identify spe-
cific opportunities for streamlining.
Suggested action plans for center organizations have
been derived from the survey findings. The active use
of NETS within and across organizations would likely
focus additional potential for streamlining.
Streamlining of the acquisition process and application
of TQM entails cultural changes:
• Management needs to demonstrate trust in and re-
spect for the work force.
• Responsibility and authority must be delegated to
lowest levels.
• User (initiator) organizations must relate to "service
organizations" as professionals and equals.
• "Service organizations" must offer timely solutions,
not road blocks, to achievement of user objectives.
• Project offices should adopt total scope control of
contracts.
• Over conservatism in policy and positions must be
bridled.
• Team building should be improved through person-
nel mobility.
• Opportunities must be exploited to recognize the
work force.
Culture Changes
• Demonstrate trust in and respect for the work force.
- Delegate responsibility and authority.
- Respect right to err.
- Exploit opportunities to recognize workforce.
• Improve team building.
- USER: recognize service organizations as profes-
sionals; and SERVICE: offer timely solutions, not
road blocks.
- Maximize inter-office mobility and NETS.
• Adopt "total scope" contract control.
• Bridle over conservatism in policy and positions.
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Interviews
Don Bean
J.A. Bethay
Porter Bridwell
Eddie Bryan
John Chapman
Keith Coates
Jimmy Crafts
Bob Dunn
Bill Eoff
Glenn Eudy
Bill Hallisey
Ed Henke
Larry Lechner
Jack Lee
Director, Administrative
Operations Office
Associate Director,
MSFC
Manager, Shuttle
Projects Office
Chief, ASRM
Productivity Engineering
Deputy Project Manager,
ASRM
Chief Engineer, ASRM
Chief, ASRM Systems
Engineering and
Integration
Shuttle-C Task Team
Deputy Manager,
Shuttle-C Task Team
Manager, Shuttle-C Task
Team
Comptroller, MSFC
Director, Procurement
Productivity
Improvement Office
Center Director, MSFC
Alex McCool
- Director, Safety and
Mission Assurance
Director, Science and
Engineering
- Project Manager, ASRM
- Productivity
Improvement Office
- President, MESA
(MSFC union)
- Former ASRM Chief
Engineer
- Chief, RSMR
Contracting Officer
(Procurement)
- Chief Council (Legal)
- Productivity
Engineering, ASRM
- Shuttle-C Task Team
- Chief, ASRM
Contracting Officer
(Procurement)
- Staff Member, MSFC
Director's Staff
Dr. George McDonough -
Royce Mitchell
Sammy Nabors
David Nicholas
Jack Nichols
Emil Posey
Susan Smith
Doug Thomas
Jack Walker
Ray Woods
Lowell Zoller
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Summary
Motivational Principles in Use
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine the
motivational principles and theories most favored by
today's managers. Please read each description care-
fully and mark the appropriate category. Indicate your
level of management in your local organization struc-
ture in order to help categorize results. This question-
naire is completely confidential and will be sent to a
number of managers in your organization thus making
your response anonymous.
5 First Level Mgmt 4 Middle Level Mgmt
Check any appropriate box
2 Top Level Mgmt
Herzberg's Theory of Job Satisfaction -
Motivators versus hygiene factors
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs -
Physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, self-actualization
McGregor's Theory X & Theory Y -
2 basic assumptions on human behavior
Managerial Grid-
Graph of production concerns versus concerns for people
Likert's System IV-
4 systems to categorize organizations
In Search of Excellence-
Eight basic principles to stay on top
McClelland's Achievers-
Scoring people's need for achievement
Porter & Lawler's Satisfaction Theory-
Performance -> rewards -> satisfaction
Likert's Team Management-
Linking pin concept to link management teams together
Vroom's Valence Theory -
Motivation = sum of valence x expectancy
Max Weber's Bureaucracy -
Division of labor and small span of control in org. structure
MBO -
Management by objectives
Quality Circles.
Voluntary problem solving teams
Hersey & Blanchard's LASI-
Situational management
Tannenbaum & Schmidt's Leadership Patterns-
Democratic versus autocratic
Ouchi's Theory Z-
Japanese approach to motivation
Unfamiliar Familiar Use
6 5 3
3 8 5
4 7 3
9 2 1
10 1 0
4 7 2
9 2 1
7 4 1
11 0 0
11 0 0
9 2 0
1 10 4
1 10 3
9 2 1
8 3 2
10 1 1
14 Surveyed - 11 responses
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TITLE
Assembly Areas (3621)
RESP.
Product Assurance: J. Doll
Production Operation: R. Nelson
CHART PAGE
M-1 A-1 2
Discrepancies
per 1000
Manhours (MHs)
Goal
100.0 -
90.0 -
80.0 -
70.0 -
60.0 -
50.0 -
40.0 -
- 30.0-'
20.0
10.0
0.0
1989/1990
Number of Discrepancies
Touch Labor Manhours
Discr./1000 MHs
6 Mo. Avg. Discr./
1000 MH ....
I I 1 I I I I I I I 1
D J F M A M J J A S O N
D J F M A M J J A S O N
40 72 78 75 105i 80 57 82 '48 110 44 25
4753 5140 5178 4439!6429 4829 5011 6042 5162 5952 4365 3222
8.4 14.0 15.1 16.9 16.3 16.6 11.4 13.6 9.3 18.5 10.1 7.8
12.3 12.0 11.5 12.2 13.5 14.6 15.1 15.0 14.0 14.4 13.4 12.3
EXTERNAL TANK PERFORMANCE TREND
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
2O%
10%
0%
Discrepancy Types
iliil
A; Weld Bead Defects (Rls) (i2) I
B Damage (5)
C Oil Cans (3)
D Porosity Anom. (3)
E Ta!l 0ut (!)
Comments
This chart summarizes Dept.
3621 discrepancies
documented on MARS, DRs
& WRRs (R1 Heat Repairs).
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TITLE
SOFI Shop (3673)
RESP.
Product Assurance: T. Pettit
Production Operation: J. Litfin
Discrepancies
per 1000
Manhours (MHs)
50.0
40.0-
30.0 -
100% -
90%
8O%
70%
6O%
5O%
40%
30%
20%
10%
O%
CHART PAGE
Mol B-2 5
Discrepancy Types
20.0-
Goal
(12) 10.0-
0.0
D
I t I I I I I I I I
J F M A M J J A S O N
1989/1990 D J F M A M J J A S O N
Number of Discrepancies 15 16 24 14 24 11 19 23 10 18 111 6
Touch Labor Manhours 10871407 1319 839 1568 1273 1141 1319 1270 1819 140311200
Discr./1000MHs . 13.8i 11.4 18.2 16.7 15.3 8.6 16.7 17.4 7.9 9.9 7.81 5.0
6 Mo. Avg. Discr./ IIO00MH .... 11.2 10.6 13.0 13.7 14.2 13.9 14.3 15.4 13.6 12.5 11.2 10.7
EXTERNAL TANK PERFORMANCE TRENDS
_, Voids (5)
B Physical/Mech. Prop. (1)i
C
Comments
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TITLE
Production In-House Latent Defects
RESP.
Product Assurance: R. Willoughby
Production Operation: P. Donohue
0.50 -
0.45 -
0.40
0.35
Latent Defects
(L/Ds) per 1000
Manhours (MHs)
(Production &
Inspection
Touch Labor
Combined)
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
D J F M A M J J A S O N
1990 D J F M A M J J A S O N
Number of L/Ds 0 8 0 5 1 0 6 2 1 0 2 0
_'_"_ a bo--"_a nh ours K 41 45 46 41 58 49 46 55 46 54 40 33
oooo?.ooo
6 Mo. Avg .....
EXTERNAL TANK PERFORMANCE TRENDS
Responsibility
100% -r
90% -_
80% -i
70% -]
60% -i
50% -_
 OO,o-I
30°/°-1 N
20% -1 l_11
o%
_---'-_--Comments
; Data from this chart is
I obtained from MARS which
' are coded LXXX for
Department Liable. Displayed
are the responsible
departments (if identified), as
well as a brief description
of the defect,
m
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ASRM Product
Development Methodology
5 Phase Process Control Program
• Development-Perform system design
quality planning
and begin
• Characterization-Perform parameter and tolerance
design, begin analysis of measuring system, SPC
plan
• Verification-Process proofing, measurement sys-
tem verification, process capability analysis
• Control-Process control procedure, SPC
• Improvement-Project teams, 12 step program
Process IDevelopment
Process Flow Diagram
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
Development Plans
ASRM Product Development Methodology
Offline Process Control
I Process
ICharacterization
Process Flow Diagram
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
Product/Process Specs
Process Control Criteria
Regression Models
Process
Verification
Process Flow Diagram
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
Process Capability
Prelim. SPC Limits
Proved Procedures
MSA Results
(From Process
Verification)
Process Flow Diagram
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
Process Capability
Prelim. SPC Limits
Proved Procedures
MSA Results
ASRM Product Development Methodology
Online Process Control
Process
Control
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
SPC Limits
Control Charts
MSA Results
Preventative and
Corrective Action
Matrices
Process IImp v ment
Updated:
Process Flow
Cause and Effect Diagram
Quality Spreadsheets
SPC Limits
Control Charts
MSA Results
Preventative and
Corrective Action
Matrices
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Liner Preparation and Application
Quality Planning Spreadsheets
19 September 1990
Customer
Requirement
X
Product
Product Feature
Feature X
Spreadsheet 1 Process
Feature
1
Process
Feature
X
Spreadsheet 2 Control
Parameter
Review and Comment
Return to Tom McCabe Spreadsheet 3
I PRELIMINARY
Liner Preparation and Application Quality
Planning Customer Requirements
X Product Features Product
Features
Propellant/Liner/
Insulator Bond
Strength in
Required ASRM
Environments
t Process Verification
Testing
Liner Weight
Reliability
Safety
Cost
Schedule
3 3
1 3
0 3
1 1
1 3
1 2
1 0
3 3
3 3
3 0
0 0
3 3
2 1
0 1
Liner Preparation and Application Quality Planning
Product Features X Process Features Matrix
Product Feature /;_#_
Storage Conditions 00!0
!
Liner Composition 0010 i0
[
i
I
Liner Thickness & 221313
Weight !
t
I
Cure 0010 I0
i0 0 0 010 0 01 0 0 01010 0 1 2 0 0 0
L ....... _ _ ...........
0 0 010 0 01 2 3 010]0 2 1 2 3 3 3
330101 11 233 li31 003201I
0 02t2,_21 0 000 0100_2132 1
_ _ _ _,_,_
03020100
I
01!031123
=
i30221323
1
1
io2o2ooo_
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Cause Effect Diagram Inert Processing
Insulation Finish
I Process I I Machines I
Verify_ .....
Cure _ _nys_ca_ uamage
- / - \ / Toolingand Insulation/beparaze / .9_m_.%,-/-- . _ .=_^.
=o,..,9 --/---- ;,-_;_- \ vacuum uag -,,,u,
_,=_. / Dug r _ Removed Robot
Coupons Flashing _ Cell Ultrasonic
i.icln_,,Trim _,- _ Acceptance Measurement Weight Scale
............ / _Parameters S,,stem
_, ", \ -- J _ Automated
uleeo _ Weigh _ Insulation
Seal and_Purge_ Insulated Segments _ Cleaning
Move to Auto UT Station %" - _,, _ Measure
_ Thickness
Trim \ .... \ and Insulratic n \
Rework Step? "_ / ",_olos -_'_,-dheslon --
/ _Unbonds _,-- Inctusions_ Finish
Details Unknown \.. __ion _ Insulation
-- for Liner
Certified _ Application
GrH Level I Special / ,,.
•" _.. .... ,,, .... / Hazard? Hot?
U/ I--_V_l ,I / . . . ,,VolatlleS.
/ _. . Inspector //v( Personnel
7- boivem _ Entry
/_ " Into
Wipes / _ \ Segment
Training - 7 Clean Cloth_ _ Respirator
Shoe Cover,
_" / Head C°ver C°ntaminati°n
I Ma.e.a,I Peoo,eI
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Cumulative Weight Factor Distribution
of Significant Ingredients
Kevlar
@ Level 3
(30 PHR)
Sulfur
@ Level 3
(2 PHR)
Rubber
@ Level 2
(60/40 PHR)
Wingtack
@ Level 3
(8 PHR)
Sb203
@ Level 1
(10 PHR)
Dechlorane
@ Lewvel 3
(35 PHR)
I I I I
2.89
2.76
1.45
0.32
Ingredients
0.15
I 1 I I I
5 10 15 20 25
Cumulative Weight Factor
23.52
Liner Process Development Step Flow
Liner I
Component I
Preparation I
1231
Install
Tooling
120
Clean Dry Liner
Insulation Insulation Application
121 121 121
Liner
Cure
121
I Seal
Segments for
Pre-Cast
St°rage120
Liner
Mixing
121
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The Herzberg Theory of Job
Satisfaction
Motivators
1. Recognition
2. Achievement
3. Possibility of growth
4. Advancement
5. Responsibility
6. Job itself
Hygienes
1. Working conditions
2. Company policy and administration
3. Interpersonal relationship with
supervisor
4. Interpersonal relationship with peers
5. Pay
Maslow's Hierarchy
of Human Needs
Each person goes through the same set of needs in the
same order. When one need is met, the individual seeks
the next need level. Some go through the hierarchy
more rapidly than others. Some never get past the
second level.
McGregor's Theory X
and Theory Y
The Theory X assumptions about human behavior are
as follows:
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of
work and will avoid it if he can.
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of
work, most people must be coerced, controlled,
directed, or threatened with punishment to get them
to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement
of organizational objectives.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed,
wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little
ambition, and wants security above all.
The Theory Y assumptions are as follows:
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in
work is as natural as play or rest.
2. External control and threat of punishment are not
the only means for bringing about effort toward
organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-
direction and self-control in the service of objec-
tives to which he is committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the
rewards associated with their achievement.
4. The average human being learns, under proper
conditions, not only to accept but to seek out
responsibility.
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of
imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solu-
tion of organizational problems is widely, not nar-
rowly distributed.
6. Under the conditions of modem industrial life, the
intellectual potentialities of the average human be-
ing are only partially utilized.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (T_M)
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY FOR THE ADVANCED
SOLID ROCKET MOTOR PROJECT
AT NASA'S MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
By Harry F. Sohramm and Kenneth W. Sullivan
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